“…Instead, what typically happened is that one would appeal to the apparent ‘whoosh’ and ‘whiz’ of temporal experience, or to the sense we are moving into the future and away from the present, and take the appeal to such putative pieces of phenomenology as sufficient to motivate the Temporal Passage Thesis (see, for instance, (Davies ), (Schuster ), (Zwart ) and (Williams )). More recently, however, Skow (), Paul (), Le Poidevin (), and Prosser (, , , ) have added a new rigour to the debate over the passage thesis by attempting to explicitly formulate and assess arguments that move from the experience of passage to the truth of the passage thesis. The rough idea is that since we all have experiences as of time passing, and since the only reasonable way of explaining these experiences relies on the existence of actual passage, we should accept the existence of actual passage.…”