I Should Have Known Better: Development of a Self-Report Measure of Gullibility

Teunisse, Alessandra K.; Case, Trevor I.; Fitness, Julie; Sweller, Naomi

doi:10.1177/0146167219858641

Cited by 31 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(83 reference statements)

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“…, suggesting that the news articles were processed adequately. 2 Both Study 1 and Study 2 also included the Gullibility Scale (Teunisse, Case, Fitness, & Sweller, 2020) and the short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Study 2 additionally included measures for religiosity (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991), spirituality (Büssing, Ostermann, & Matthiessen, 2007), conservatism (Everett, 2013), and media consumption habits (adopted from Maksl et al, 2015).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Analytical Reasoning and Source Credibility on the Evaluation of Real and Fake Full-Length News Articles

Pehlivanoglu¹,

Lin²,

Deceus³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Aim: Previous research has focused on accuracy associated with real and fake news presented in the form of news headlines only which does not capture the rich context news is frequently encountered in real life. Additionally, while the impact of analytical reasoning on news evaluation accuracy has commonly been examined, the impact of news source credibility on real and fake news detection is understudied. To address these research gaps, this project examined the role of analytical reasoning and news source credibility on evaluation of real and fake full-length news story articles. The project considered both accuracy and perceived credibility ratings as outcome variables, thus qualifying previous work focused solely on news detection accuracy. Method: We conducted two independent but parallel studies, with Study 2 as a direct replication of Study 1, employing the same design but in a larger sample (Study 1: N = 292 vs. Study 2: N = 357). In both studies, participants viewed 12 full-length news articles (6 real, 6 fake), followed by prompts to evaluate each article’s veracity and credibility. Participants were randomly assigned to view articles with a credible or non-credible source and completed the Cognitive Reflection Test as well as short demographic questions.Findings: Consistent in both studies, higher analytical reasoning was associated with greater fake news accuracy, while analytical reasoning was not associated with real news accuracy. In addition, in both studies, higher analytical reasoning was associated with lower perceived credibility for fake news, while analytical reasoning was not associated with perceived credibility for real news. Furthermore, lower analytical reasoning was associated with greater accuracy for real (but not fake) news from credible compared to non-credible sources, with this effect only detected in Study 2. Conclusions: The novel findings generated in this research are discussed in light of classical vs. naturalistic accounts of decision-making as well as cognitive processes underlying news articles evaluation. The results extend previous findings that analytical reasoning contributes to fake news detection to full-length news articles. Furthermore, news-related cues such as the credibility of the source systematically affected discrimination ability between real and fake news.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Analytical Reasoning and Source Credibility on the Evaluation of Real and Fake Full-Length News Articles

Pehlivanoglu¹,

Lin²,

Deceus³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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“…Participant gullibility was evaluated using the 12-item Gullibility Scale (GS) 23 . This is comprised of two subscales, each consisting of six questions.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Increased persuadability and credulity in people with corpus callosum dysgenesis

Richards

Barnby

Dean

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Corpus callosum dysgenesis is one of the most common congenital neurological malformations. Despite being a clear and identifiable structural alteration of the brains white matter connectivity, the impact of corpus callosum dysgenesis on cognition and behavior has remained unclear. Here we build upon past clinical observations in the literature to define the clinical phenotype of corpus callosum dysgenesis better using unadjusted and adjusted group differences compared with a neurotypical sample on a range of social and cognitive measures that have been previously reported to be impacted by a corpus callosum dysgenesis diagnosis. Those with a diagnosis of corpus callosum dysgenesis (n = 22) demonstrated significantly higher persuadability, credulity, and insensitivity to social trickery than neurotypical (n = 86) participants, after controlling for age, sex, education, autistic-like traits, social intelligence, and general cognition. To explore this further, machine learning, utilizing a set neurotypical sample for training the normative covariance structure of our psychometric variables, was used to test whether these dimensions possessed the capability to discriminate between a test-set of neurotypical and corpus callosum dysgenesis participants. We found that participants with a diagnosis of corpus callosum dysgenesis were best classed within dimension space along the same axis as persuadability, credulity, and insensitivity to social trickery after controlling for age and sex, with Leave-One-Out-Cross-Validation across 250 training-set permutations providing a mean accuracy of 71.7 percent. These results have wide-reaching implications for a) the characterization of corpus callosum dysgenesis, and b) the role of the corpus callosum in social inference.

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“…While fraud is common, some groups of individuals, such as the elderly, are targeted more frequently (Burnes et al, 2017;Cohen, 2006). In fact, people differ in how gullible they are (Teunisse, Case, Fitness, & Sweller, 2019). That is, some people may be more at risk because their general tendency to trust and believe others makes them more likely to fall for a scam.…”

Section: Who Can Be Fooled? Modeling Perceptions Of Gullibility From mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given the lack of previous studies on gullibility and facial stereotypes, we adopt a relatively broad conceptualization of gullibility here. We define a gullible individuals as someone who is very trusting (rather than distrusting), who is very naïve (rather than skeptical), and who easily believes others (rather than is easily suspicious of others; Krueger, Vogrincic-Haselbacher, & Evans, 2019;Teunisse et al, 2019;Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999). The goals of the current investigation were threefold.…”

Section: Gullibility Impressionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In all three studies, participants indicated their gullibility perceptions by rating to what extent they believe that a target is very trusting, naïve, and easily believes others (high gullibility) or very distrusting, skeptical, and easily suspicious of others (low gullibility). One might argue that this definition conflates gullibility and trust, which have been treated as separate constructs in prior research (Rotter, 1967;Teunisse et al, 2019;Yamagishi et al, 1999). For example, Teunissen and colleagues (2019) argued that trust is a generalized expectation that others are trustworthy (in absence of any information about their actual trustworthiness), whereas gullibility represents a failure to detect or act upon cues that indicate a person's untrustworthiness.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Who can be fooled? Modeling facial impressions of gullibility

Jaeger¹,

Meral²

2020

Preprint

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In many situations, ranging from cooperative exchange to fraud, people are faced with the challenge to judge how trusting or naïve (i.e., gullible) others are. In three studies, using both theory-driven and data-driven methods, we examine how people form gullibility judgments based on a person’s facial appearance. People have a shared representation of what a gullible person looks like. Gullibility impressions are positively related to trustworthiness impressions, but negatively related to dominance impressions (Study 1, n = 254). Examining the influence of a wide range of facial characteristics, we find that gullibility impressions are based on cues that have been linked to low levels of perceived threat, such as babyfacedness (Study 2, n = 403) and smiles (Study 3, n = 209). Together, these findings show that people form gullibility judgments based on facial cues that are seen as indicators of relative harmlessness (i.e., positive intentions and low capabilities).

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I Should Have Known Better: Development of a Self-Report Measure of Gullibility

Cited by 31 publications

References 46 publications

The Role of Analytical Reasoning and Source Credibility on the Evaluation of Real and Fake Full-Length News Articles

The Role of Analytical Reasoning and Source Credibility on the Evaluation of Real and Fake Full-Length News Articles

Increased persuadability and credulity in people with corpus callosum dysgenesis

Who can be fooled? Modeling facial impressions of gullibility

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