Shuanggui and Extralegal Detention in China

Abstract

This study on detention fills a gap in scholarship on China's criminal justice system. This article describes shuanggui, a form of detention used on Party members. It traces the historical legacies linking shuanggui to forms of detention practiced in imperial China and in Chinese Communist Soviets. The article then moves on to describe the birth of shuanggui and the evolution of norms regulating it. Finally, it points out how shuanggui is being regularized and institutionalized. This process is leading towards its gradual abolition or amelioration. On the other hand, it reflects the continuing evolution and sophistication of the power of the Chinese party-state.

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

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Popularity and Power: The Political Logic of Anticorruption in Authoritarian Regimes

“…Once an investigation is initiated, the DICs can search for relevant documents and evidence, question witnesses, withhold illegal gains, and most importantly, require involved individuals to provide explanations at a specific time and place. The last method, famously known as shuanggui (双规), grants DICs the power to exercise extralegal detention (Sapio 2008), making them formidable agencies with de facto coercive power. Officials who are subject to shuanggui can be held by DICs for months or even years without legal proceedings.…”

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