<i>The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug</i>*

Briggs, Rachael

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00713.x

Cited by 25 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 14 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The motivation problem belongs exclusively to the reductionist side of the debate: after realizing that one of the most natural ways of spelling out the epistemic role of chance, Lewis' Principal Principle, is incompatible with the metaphysical assumptions of reductionism pertaining chance, the reductionist side came to face the problem of finding and motivating a credence-chance principle that is both consistent with its metaphysical assumptions and that is conceptually well-motivated. Following Briggs (2009), I argued that the reductionists do not fare well in answering this problem.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What about the reductionist? Suppose she successfully answers the problems identified by Briggs (2009) and summarized in section 3, or suppose she accepts them as a cost she has to live with. Can she successfully meet her share of the explanation problem?…”

Section: 3 Unvindicating Reductionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I'll start by laying out some background in order to set the scene for the discussion to follow (section 2). Then I'll follow Briggs (2009) in identifying further problems for the reductionist, and I'll argue that, in view of these, the prospects for reductionists to be able to meet the motivation problem are slim at best (section 3). Then I'll turn to a fuller discussion of the explanation problem (section 4).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Vindicating Chance: On The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate

Casó

2016

CRHF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of chance is presented, and the dialectical burdens acquired by each side of the debate are identified: the motivation problem and the explanation problem. It is argued that, whilethe motivation problem presents no challenge to non-reductionists, reductionists are unable successfully to answer it. Contrary to what has been suggested, both sides share the burden of the explanation problem. It is argued that non- eductionists can successfully answer it, whereas reductionists are unable to make the corresponding claim. Hence, the non-reductionist side has an important dialectical advantage.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: 3 Unvindicating Reductionismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Vindicating Chance: On The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate

Casó

2016

CRHF

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…There is a large literature of attempts to solve (or dissolve) the "Big Bad Bug," and many replies, but I will not survey those here. For further reading, please see David Lewis (1994), Ned Hall (1994), Jenann Ismael (2008), and Rachael Briggs (2009). • Past events always have chances of one or zero.…”

Section: One Metaphysical Chancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Universe Had One Chance

Demarest¹

2016

Philos. of Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a deterministically evolving world, the usefulness of non-trivial probabilities can seem mysterious. I use the 'Mentaculus' machinery developed by David Albert and Barry Loewer to show how all probabilities in such a world can be derived from a single, initial chance event. I go on to argue that this is the only genuine chance event. Perhaps surprisingly, we have good evidence of its existence and nature. I argue that the existence of this chance event justifies our epistemic reliance on non-trivial probabilities.

show abstract

“…A third point of contention is over whether we should abandon the New Principle, since some have argued that there are abstract reasons for favoring the New Principle over the Principal Principle (see Hall (2004)), though others have argued that adopting the New Principle violates the spirit of the regularity approach (see Hoefer (1997), Briggs (2009)). A fourth point of contention is over whether this restriction succeeds in avoiding undermining worries (see Briggs (2009)). 26 In particular, Hoefer argues that the restriction to "small-to-medium sized" events trivializes the New Principle.…”

Section: The Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem

Meacham¹

2014

Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Forthcoming in Asymmetries in Chance and Time, ed. Handfield and Wilson. AbstractIn recent work, Cohen (2009) andHoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis's is that they allow special sciences and the macroscopic realm to have chances that are autonomous from those of physics and the microscopic realm. A worry for these proposals is that autonomous chances may place incompatible constraints on rational belief. I examine this worry, and attempt to determine (i) what kinds of conflicts would be problematic, and (ii) whether these proposals lead to problematic conflicts. After working through a pair of cases, I conclude that these proposals do give rise to problematic conflicts.

show abstract

*The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug**

Cited by 25 publications

References 14 publications

Vindicating Chance: On The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate

Vindicating Chance: On The Reductionism/Non-Reductionism Debate

The Universe Had One Chance

Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About