<i>The Historical Presidency</i>Presidential Incentives, Bureaucratic Control, and Party Building in the Republican Era

Rogowski, Jon C.

doi:10.1111/psq.12230

Cited by 7 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…1, 61) recognized the potential for patronage appointments to exalt presidential influence: "The president's patronage is, in the hands of a skilful intriguer, an engine of far-spreading potency. out appointments to advantage his party likely would have been an important indicator of a president's success (Rogowski 2015). Though appointments were heavily influenced by party politics, a president's ability to mete 2 Here and elsewhere, Skowronek (1992; challenges the modern presidency paradigm, and instead emphasizes the importance of understanding presidential behavior in the regimes presidents inhabit in political (rather than chronological) time.…”

Section: Political Influence and The Pre-modern Presidencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1, 61) recognized the potential for patronage appointments to exalt presidential influence: “The president’s patronage is, in the hands of a skilful intriguer, an engine of far-spreading potency. By it he can oblige a vast number of persons, can bind their interests to his own, can fill important places with the men of his choice.” Though appointments were heavily influenced by party politics, a president’s ability to mete out appointments to advantage his party likely would have been an important indicator of a president’s success (Rogowski 2015).…”

Section: Political Influence and The Pre-modern Presidencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

Rogowski

2016

Am Polit Sci Rev

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R esearch on presidential power focuses almost exclusively on the modern era, while earlier presidents are said to have held office while congressional dominance was at its peak. In this article, I argue that nineteenth-century presidents wielded greater influence than commonly recognized due to their position as head of the executive branch. Using an original dataset on the county-level distribution of U.S. post offices from 1876 to 1896, I find consistent evidence that counties represented by a president's copartisans in the U.S. House received substantially more post offices than other counties, and that these advantages were especially large under divided government and in electorally important states. These results are robust across model specifications and when examining the Senate. The findings challenge key components of the congressional dominance and modern presidency theses, and have important implications for scholarship on interbranch relations, bureaucratic politics, and American political development.

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Section: Political Influence and The Pre-modern Presidencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Political Influence and The Pre-modern Presidencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

Rogowski

2016

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“… 33 This finding builds on recent research that finds American presidents to be the dominant institutional player in other domains of federal policymaking, such as in distributive and particularistic politics (e.g., Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Rogowski 2015; Rogowski 2016). …”

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confidence: 74%

“…This finding builds on recent research that finds American presidents to be the dominant institutional player in other domains of federal policymaking, such as in distributive and particularistic politics (e.g.,Berry, Burden and Howell 2010;Rogowski 2015;Rogowski 2016).34 This may represent the first attempt of a chief executive to increase his power even before being elected to office! Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success…”

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confidence: 99%

Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success

McGrath¹,

Rogowski²,

Ryan³

2016

PSRM

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Presidential systems around the world vary in the proportion of legislators required to override an executive veto. We argue that the nature of the override provision affects executive influence in policymaking; as the proportion needed to override a veto increases, so should executive influence. We leverage varying override requirements across the US states to conduct a comparative study of executive influence over budgetary outcomes. Using governors’ budget requests and enacted appropriations for fiscal years 1987–2011, we provide evidence that state legislatures better accommodate budgetary requests in states with higher override requirements. Further, governors whose preferences are extreme relative to the legislature are more likely to have their budgetary goals met in states with a higher veto threshold.

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“… Rogowski and Gibson () provide evidence of the electoral rewards for post office allocation during this time period, particularly upon the introduction of the secret ballot. Post offices may also have been important ways for presidents to contribute to local party‐building efforts (Rogowski ).…”

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confidence: 99%

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism

Rogowski

2016

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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How do electoral institutions affect legislative behavior? Though a large body of theoretical scholarship posits a negative relationship between multimember districting and the provision of particularistic goods, empirical scholarship has found little evidence in support of this expectation. Using data on the provision of US post offices from 1876 to 1896, a period during which many states elected congressional representatives from at-large districts, and a differences-in-differences approach, I find that counties represented by at-large representatives received approximately 8% fewer post offices. The results have important implications for studying how electoral institutions affect incentives for legislative behavior.How do elected officials represent their constituencies? In designing the American system of government, the Founders paid close attention to how institutional structures would provide incentives for legislative behavior. For instance, in Federalist 52, Madison wrote that "frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy" by which members of the House of Representatives would "have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people." A wide range of electoral institutions, including term limits (e.g., Bernhardt,

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The Historical PresidencyPresidential Incentives, Bureaucratic Control, and Party Building in the Republican Era

Cited by 7 publications

References 40 publications

Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

Presidential Influence in an Era of Congressional Dominance

Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Particularism

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