Modality 2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0010
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

IBE, GMR, and Metaphysical Projects

Abstract: David Lewis defends Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) by way of an inference to the best explanation (IBE); reasons of theoretical utility are taken as markers of truth. Warrant for thinking that IBE is reliable depends on the availability of access to the relevant matters that is independent of the various uses of IBE. Domains permitting no such independent access are domains over which we can have no confidence that instances of IBE are reliable. Genuine Modal Realism's plurality of worlds is one such domain. The … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
11
0

Year Published

2012
2012
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6
1

Relationship

2
5

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 11 publications
(11 citation statements)
references
References 99 publications
0
11
0
Order By: Relevance
“…They came to be tasked with articulating important aspects of modal reality. I will not rehearse arguments I have given elsewhere against Lewis's use of theoretical utility arguments and the like as failing to warrant his metaphysics (Shalkowski, 2010), (Shalkowski, 2012), which will apply suitably adapted to the other programmes.…”
Section: Forgetfulnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They came to be tasked with articulating important aspects of modal reality. I will not rehearse arguments I have given elsewhere against Lewis's use of theoretical utility arguments and the like as failing to warrant his metaphysics (Shalkowski, 2010), (Shalkowski, 2012), which will apply suitably adapted to the other programmes.…”
Section: Forgetfulnessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Michael Huemer () works through four different accounts of the evidential value of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and argues that none applies to the philosophical cases, suggesting that in typical philosophical contexts ontological simplicity has no evidential value. Scott Shalkowski () argues that inference to the best explanation can be empirically shown to be a reliable mode of inference where it concerns observables (so that there is the possibility of independent access to confirm its results), but not where its conclusions concern unobservable facts (, 177). Shalkowski concludes that, while inference to the best explanation may be perfectly good in the ordinary empirical cases that motivate it, “there is little hope to be found in the use of [inference to the best explanation] to settle metaphysical questions” (, 184).…”
Section: Metaphysical Approaches To Conceptual Choicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…41 Compare Magnus and Callender (2004). 42 Bennett (2009), Huemer (2009), Shalkowski (2010, Kreigel (2013) and Willard (2014) all seem sympathetic to this objection. See Brenner (2016) for some responses.…”
Section: Applicationsmentioning
confidence: 99%