ID-Based Strong Designated Verifier Signature over <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" id="M1"><mml:mrow><mml:mi mathvariant="script">R</mml:mi></mml:mrow></mml:math>-SIS Assumption

Cai, Jie; Han, Jiang; Zhang, Pingyuan; Zheng, Zhen; Wang, Hao; Lü, Guangshi; Xu, Qiuliang

doi:10.1155/2019/9678095

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…To achieve our goal of post-quantum asynchronous DAKE, we thus need a post-quantum designated verifier signature scheme. While there is a long line of research on DVS schemes from pre-quantum assumptions (including [16,26,51,59,62,78,80,87]), comparatively little is available in the literature on post-quantum DVS schemes. An isogeny-based DVS scheme was proposed in [81] but is insecure due to key reuse attacks identified in [46].…”

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A long line of research has scrutinized the security of DVS schemes in different settings, including [16,26,51,59,62,78,80,87]. For the purpose of this paper, it suffices to define the security notions of unforgeability and source hiding.…”

Section: Designated Verifier Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The property of source hiding also appears under different terms in the literature such as the designated verifier property [51,78], non-transferability [80], source deniable [42], untransferability [16], and recently off-the-record [26]. While all these definitions share the intuition that the sender can blame another party (in particular, the designated receiver) as the originator of a signature, they vary in the adversary capabilities, i.e., whether the adversary is unbounded or whether it gets access to the secret keys.…”

Section: Designated Verifier Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Post-quantum Asynchronous Deniable Key Exchange and the Signal Handshake

Brendel

Fiedler

Günther

et al. 2022

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The key exchange protocol that establishes initial shared secrets in the handshake of the Signal end-to-end encrypted messaging protocol has several important characteristics: (1) it runs asynchronously (without both parties needing to be simultaneously online), (2) it provides implicit mutual authentication while retaining deniability (transcripts cannot be used to prove either party participated in the protocol), and (3) it retains security even if some keys are compromised (forward secrecy and beyond). All of these properties emerge from clever use of the highly flexible Diffie-Hellman protocol.While quantum-resistant key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) can replace Diffie-Hellman key exchange in some settings, there is no KEM-based replacement for the Signal handshake that achieves all three aforementioned properties, in part due to the inherent asymmetry of KEM operations. In this paper, we show how to construct asynchronous deniable key exchange by combining KEMs and designated verifier signature (DVS) schemes. There are several candidates for post-quantum DVS schemes, either direct constructions or via ring signatures. This yields a template for an efficient post-quantum realization of the Signal handshake with the same asynchronicity and security properties as the original Signal protocol.

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Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Designated Verifier Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Designated Verifier Signaturesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Post-quantum Asynchronous Deniable Key Exchange and the Signal Handshake

Brendel

Fiedler

Günther

et al. 2022

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…A series of designated verifier signatures with particular functions were proposed [17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25]. For example, to solve the key management problem, Huang et al proposed an identity-based SDVS [26].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lattice-Based Self-Enhancement Authorized Accessible Privacy Authentication for Cyber-Physical Systems

Liu

Wang

et al. 2022

Security and Communication Networks

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Healthcare cyber-physical system significantly facilitates healthcare services and patient treatment effectiveness by analyzing patients’ health information data conveniently. Nevertheless, it also develops the threats to the confidentiality of health information, patients’ privacy, and decidability of medical disputes. And, with the advances of quantum computing technology, most existing anonymous authentication schemes are becoming a growing threat to traditional cryptosystems. To address these problems, for healthcare cyber-physical systems, we propose a new lattice-based self-enhancement authorized accessible privacy authentication scheme by using a strong designated verifier double-authentication-preventing signature technique, called SEAPA. The SEAPA achieves three security and privacy requirements including unforgeability, anonymity for patients’ information, and self-enhancement for patients themselves. A detailed security proof shows our proposal achieves those required security goals. Finally, our construction is demonstrated by parameter analysis and performance evaluation to have reasonable efficiency.

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“…They also proved the basic security requirement of their scheme in the standard model. Up to present, various DVS variants 19–39 have been proposed. Still, none of existing DVS systems deals with the issue of lifetime of signing capability.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time-constrained strong multi-designated verifier signature suitable for Internet of things–based collaborative fog computing systems

Lin

2021

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Fog computing is viewed as an extended technique of cloud computing. In Internet of things–based collaborative fog computing systems, a fog node aggregating lots of data from Internet of things devices has to transmit the information to distributed cloud servers that will collaboratively verify it based on some predefined auditing policy. However, compromised fog nodes controlled by an adversary might inject bogus data to cheat or confuse remote servers. It also causes the waste of communication and computation resources. To further control the lifetime of signing capability for fog nodes, an appropriate mechanism is crucial. In this article, the author proposes a time-constrained strong multi-designated verifier signature scheme to meet the above requirement. In particular, a conventional non-delegatable strong multi-designated verifier signature scheme with low computation is first given. Based on its constructions, we show how to transform it into a time-constrained variant. The unforgeability of the proposed schemes is formally proved based on the famous elliptic curve discrete logarithm assumption. The security requirement of strong signer ambiguity for our substantial constructions is also analyzed by utilizing the intractable assumption of decisional Diffie–Hellman. Moreover, some comparisons in terms of the signature size and computational costs for involved entities among related mechanisms are made.

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ID-Based Strong Designated Verifier Signature over R-SIS Assumption

Cited by 6 publications

References 21 publications

Post-quantum Asynchronous Deniable Key Exchange and the Signal Handshake

Post-quantum Asynchronous Deniable Key Exchange and the Signal Handshake

Lattice-Based Self-Enhancement Authorized Accessible Privacy Authentication for Cyber-Physical Systems

Time-constrained strong multi-designated verifier signature suitable for Internet of things–based collaborative fog computing systems

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