Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

Hansson, Sven Ove

doi:10.1007/s11225-006-8100-3

Cited by 10 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 16 publications

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“…A few theorists have noted that those who invoke deontic logic to argue against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas demonstrate that in ideal worlds there can be no genuine moral dilemmas, but this fails to disprove the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas in the actual, nonideal world. See Holbo 2002; Hansson 2006.…”

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Idealizing Morality

Tessman¹

2010

Hypatia

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Implicit in feminist and other critiques of ideal theorizing is a particular view of what normative theory should be like. Although I agree with the rejection of ideal theorizing that oppression theorists (and other theorists of justice) have advocated, the proposed alternative of nonideal theorizing is also problematic. Nonideal theorizing permits one to address oppression by first describing (nonideal) oppressive conditions, and then prescribing the best action that is possible or feasible given the conditions. Borrowing an insight from the “moral dilemmas debate”—namely that moral wrongdoing or failure can be unavoidable—I suggest that offering (only) action-guidance under nonideal conditions obscures the presence and significance of unavoidable moral failure. An adequate normative theory should be able to issue a further, non-action-guiding evaluative claim, namely that the best that is possible under oppressive conditions is not good enough, and may constitute a moral failure. I find exclusively action-guiding nonideal theory to be both insufficiently nonidealizing (because it idealizes the moral agent by falsely characterizing the agent as always able to avoid moral wrongdoing) and meanwhile too strongly adapted to the nonideal (because normative expectations are lowered and detrimentally adapted to options that, while the best possible, are still unacceptable).

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Idealizing Morality

Tessman¹

2010

Hypatia

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Deontic Logic

Hansson¹

2013

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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In discussions on moral norms we tend to assume that a reasonable system of norms should have certain structural properties. Obligations should be consistent, so that a person cannot be morally required both to visit her father in his home and to stay out of the town where he lives. Certain norms imply other norms; someone who has a duty to mow her neighbor's lawn also has permission to enter her garden in order to do so. Deontic logic is the discipline that attempts to systematize such structural properties of systems of norms. Along with decision theory, the logic of preference, and game theory and rational choice, deontic logic is one of the disciplines that apply formal rigor to moral reasoning and to the subject matter of moral philosophy in general ( see Preference; Game Theory and rational choice; Moral Reasoning).

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Deontic Logic

Hansson¹

2020

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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Deontic logic is the discipline that attempts to systematize structural properties of systems of norms. Although our everyday reasoning does not always conform exactly to principles of deontic logic, logical investigations can be useful as means to express ideas from moral philosophy in a precise way. Topics in moral philosophy that can be clarified with the help of deontic logic include the relationship between norms and values, supererogation, prima facie versus overall obligations, and the resolution of moral dilemmas.

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Ideal Worlds — Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic

Cited by 10 publications

References 16 publications

Idealizing Morality

Idealizing Morality

Deontic Logic

Deontic Logic

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