Idealization

Elliott-Graves, Alkistis; Weisberg, M. K.

doi:10.1111/phc3.12109

Cited by 17 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…cisely the desirability of deidealization-thus giving deidealization a pivotal role in distinguishing between different notions of idealization (Nowak 1992(Nowak , 2000Weisberg 2007;Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014).…”

Section: Deidealization: No Easy Reversalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deidealization: No Easy Reversals

Knuuttila¹,

Morgan²

2019

Philos. of Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical interest despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes. We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing, and deidealizing as situating. On closer inspection, models turn out much more inflexible than the reversal thesis would have us believe, and deidealization emerges as a creative part of modeling.

show abstract

Section: Deidealization: No Easy Reversalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deidealization: No Easy Reversals

Knuuttila¹,

Morgan²

2019

Philos. of Sci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moreover, such judgments cannot deal with concrete notions of any kind comprising concrete things, situations, and processes of physical reality or idealizations thereof. 4 When occurring in a judgment, such notions inevitably "pollute" it by adding "something empirical" to its content. Many abstract notions from the theoretical sciences are also empirically loaded  for example, such notions of theoretical physics as "elasticity", "conductivity", and "speed".…”

Section: Abstractions Of Higher Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Scientific Philosophy

Shramko

2019

LLP

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The goal of this paper is to explain the nature of philosophy as a distinct science with its own subject-matter. This is achieved through a comparative analysis of mathematical and philosophical knowledge that reveals a profound similarity between mathematics and philosophy as mutually complementary sciences exploring the field of abstract entities that can be comprehended only by purely a priori theoretical inquiry. By considering this complementarity, a general definition of philosophy can be obtained by dualizing the traditional Aristotelian definition of mathematics as the "science of quantity". Philosophy should thus be interpreted as an a priori science of the pure qualitative attributes of being.

show abstract

“…For one thing, general equilibrium theory was, and to some extent still is, the theoretical core of rigorous economic theory-including being the foundation of graduate education during the last half of the twentieth century -and while Schelling's model is (justly) respected, it has always been considered a special topic and was never anything like the core analytical framework of economic theory. Secondly, models such as Schelling's often start from a general feature of the real world (although not necessarily a specific real world event) that prompts an explanation (Aydinonat 2007;Elliott-Graves and Weisberg 2014;Weisberg 2013) and this concretizes such models in a way that was never the case for abstract general equilibrium theory. Finally, I will show how robustness played a role both in the period where the stability results were considered successful and the later period where they were considered a failure, thus using one example to examine both aspects of derivational robustness analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Derivational robustness, credible substitute systems and mathematical economic models: the case of stability analysis in Walrasian general equilibrium theory

Hands

2015

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper supports the literature which argues that derivational robustness can have epistemic import in highly idealized economic models. The defense is based on a particular example from mathematical economic theory, the dynamic Walrasian general equilibrium model. It is argued that derivational robustness first increased and later decreased the credibility of the Walrasian model. The example demonstrates that derivational robustness correctly describes the practices of a particular group of influential economic theorists and provides support for the arguments of philosophers who have offered a general epistemic justification of such practices.

show abstract

Idealization

Cited by 17 publications

References 25 publications

Deidealization: No Easy Reversals

Deidealization: No Easy Reversals

The Nature of Scientific Philosophy

Derivational robustness, credible substitute systems and mathematical economic models: the case of stability analysis in Walrasian general equilibrium theory

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About