2013
DOI: 10.1007/s00521-013-1478-8
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Identification of probe request attacks in WLANs using neural networks

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Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
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“…In reference [18], they described a method for identifying probe request attacks by classifying real-world WLAN data frames from a station (STA) using a neural network (NN) classifier. Signal strength, sequence number, frame sub-type, and delta time were the four variables used to train the supervised feed-forward NN classifier to distinguish between genuine and malicious frames.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In reference [18], they described a method for identifying probe request attacks by classifying real-world WLAN data frames from a station (STA) using a neural network (NN) classifier. Signal strength, sequence number, frame sub-type, and delta time were the four variables used to train the supervised feed-forward NN classifier to distinguish between genuine and malicious frames.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Table I shows the operations performed during the Thread DTLS handshake, indicating that elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and SHA-256 algorithms are executed many times during the handshake, causing significant computational load. Unfortunately, most hardware platforms feature only [35] √ − + Handshake Flooding [28] √ − + Network Sniffing [20] √ + + Man-In-Middle Attack [20] √ + + Offline Dictionary Attack [26] √ + + Online Dictionary Attack [26] √ + + Radio Jamming [32] √ − + Symbol Flipping [32] √ + + Signal Overshadowing [32] √ + + Link layer jamming [31] √ − + Node-specific flooding [31] √ − + Back-off Manipulation [31] √ − + CCA Manipulation [31] √ − + Same Nonce Attack [30] √ + + Replay Attack [31] √ + + Replay-protection Attack [31] √ + + ACK Spoofing [31] √ − + ACK Dropping [31] √ − + GTS-related Attacks [31] √ √ + + PANID Conflict Attack [31] √ + + Bootstrapping Attack [31] √ + + Steganography Attack [31] √ + + Routing Hop Manipulation [33] √ + + Routing Redirection [33] √ + + Black/grey Hole Attack [34] √ + + Worm Hole Attack [34] √ + + Link Spoofing Attack [34] √ + + Configuration Mechanism Abuse [20] √ + + Component Replacement [20] √ + + Microprobing [20] √ − − hardware acceleration for AES to support message encryption, but not for ECC and SHA-256. An effective countermeasure for handshake flooding attacks would be to speed up ECC and SHA-256 computation through hardware acceleration.…”
Section: A Handshake Flooding (Attack C/2)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The results show that the Radmin can accurately work on both the user and kernel spaces. Ratnayake et al [22] proposed in their study a scheme for probe request attack detection using a neural network (NN)classifier to classify a Station (STA's) real-world WLAN traffic frames. Four features, signal strength, sequence number, frame sub-type and delta time, were used to train the supervised feed forward NN classifier to differentiate a legitimate frame from a malicious one.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%