Identifying mental states from neural states under mental constraints

Atmanspacher, Harald

doi:10.1098/rsfs.2011.0058

Cited by 7 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…This construction procedure is not only applicable to physics (e.g. thermodynamics, fluid dynamics), but to neuroscience as well [22].…”

Section: Complexity: Rayleigh -Bé Nard Convectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fluid convection, constraint and causation

Bishop

2011

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Complexity-nonlinear dynamics for my purposes in this essay-is rich with metaphysical and epistemological implications but is receiving sustained philosophical analysis only recently. I will explore some of the subtleties of causation and constraint in RayleighBénard convection as an example of a complex phenomenon, and extract some lessons for further philosophical reflection on top-down constraint and causation particularly with respect to causal foundationalism.Keywords: fluid dynamics; reduction; contextual emergence; causation COMPLEXITY: NONLINEAR DYNAMICSQuintessential examples of complexity resulting from nonlinear dynamics are (i) the butterfly effect, where the flapping of a butterfly's wings in Argentina can influence the formation of a tornado in Texas three weeks later and (ii) Rayleigh-Bénard convection, where an extremely small perturbation in a fluid trapped between two plates and where a heat differential is maintained can influence the particular kind of convection that arises. Complex systems typically are analysed as dynamical systems, mathematical models where time can be either a continuous or a discrete variable. Many complex systems involve nonlinear interactions, my focus here, but others might involve intricate networks [1]. Such models may be studied as purely mathematical objects or may be used to describe a target system (some kind of physical, ecological or financial system, say).A dynamical system is characterized as linear or nonlinear depending on whether the principle of linear superposition holds. For linear systems, the principle holds if any multiplicative change in a variable, by a factor a say, implies a change of its output proportional to a. A dynamical system is nonlinear if linear superposition fails. Physically, this failure corresponds to a system's output not changing proportionally to any change in input. The phenomenon of sensitive dependence-the smallest change in the initial conditions can issue forth in a drastic change in a system's behaviour-registers this non-proportional response. The most-cited measure of sensitive dependence involves an exponential parametrized by the largest global Lyapunov exponent. Such exponents are derived through a linear stability analysis of the trajectories of nonlinear equations in a suitable state space, but turn out to be of limited pragmatic value [2].Dynamical systems typically are analysed in a state space, an abstract mathematical space of points where each point is assumed to represent a possible state of the target system. It is then possible to study a mathematical model of the target system by following the model's trajectory-the history of state transitions-in state space. These trajectories are governed by the model equations and represent the model's behaviour in terms of its state transitions from the initial state to some chosen final state. Using these mathematical tools, complex phenomena such as convection can be analysed precisely.

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“…This construction procedure is not only applicable to physics (e.g. thermodynamics, fluid dynamics), but to neuroscience as well [22].…”

Section: Complexity: Rayleigh -Bé Nard Convectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fluid convection, constraint and causation

Bishop

2011

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“… 2 See, e.g., Ref. ( 19 , 20 ) for specific accounts of supervenient emergentism in (cognitive) neuroscience. …”

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confidence: 99%

Cognitive Neuroscience and Causal Inference: Implications for Psychiatry

Dijkstra

Bruin²

2016

Front. Psychiatry

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In this paper, we investigate to what extent it is justified to draw conclusions about causal relations between brain states and mental states from cognitive neuroscience studies. We first explain the views of two prominent proponents of the interventionist account of causation: Woodward and Baumgartner. We then discuss the implications of their views in the context of traditional cognitive neuroscience studies in which the effect of changes in mental state on changes in brain states is investigated. After this, we turn to brain stimulation studies in which brain states are manipulated to investigate the effects on mental states. We argue that, depending on whether one sides with Woodward or Baumgartner, it is possible to draw causal conclusions from both types of studies (Woodward) or from brain stimulation studies only (Baumgartner). We show what happens to these conclusions if we adopt different views of the relation between mental states and brain states. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for psychiatry and the treatment of psychiatric disorders.

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“…However, its status remains the subject of some controversy, as is shown for example by Scerri's paper on differing views in the context of chemistry. The idea of top-down causation is intimately tied in to the concept of the contextual emergence of complexity [1,9] and associated discussions of reductionism, with the claim being made by one of us [14] that true complexity cannot emerge in a bottom-up way alone. This is supported particularly by the way top-down effects can be seen at work in physiology [7] and in the functioning of the brain [9] and society [10].…”

Section: A 'Roadmap' For Further Research In This Areamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then there is a need to take the discussion further in each specific area, chemistry [3] and evolutionary theory [6] being particularly controversial examples where more clarity is needed (indeed even the concept of the chemical bond is in question: see Ball [17]). The idea of top-down causation is prevalent in almost all holistic discussions of brain function [9] and social interactions [8,10], but perhaps not often identified as such; making that identification specific will be useful. Important here is determining what different kinds of top-down causation should be recognized [13,14]; this needs further discussion.…”

Section: A 'Roadmap' For Further Research In This Areamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The need is for an interdisciplinary dialogue, which we hope this Theme Issue provides. The issue arises in physics (Bishop [1]; Loewer [2]), chemistry (Scerri [3]), microbiology (Jaeger & Calkins [4]), epigenetics (Davies [5]), evolutionary biology (Okasha [6]), physiology (Noble [7]), neuroscience/psychology/cognitive science (Berntson et al [8]; Atmanspacher [9]), social science (Elder-Vass [10]) and computer science (Booch [11]). Many examples provide good evidence for top-down causation.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Top-down causation: an integrating theme within and across the sciences?

2011

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This issue of the journal is focused on ‘top-down (downward) causation'. The words in this title, however, already raise or beg many questions. Causation can be of many kinds. They form our ways of ordering our scientific understanding of the world, all the way from the reductive concept of cause as elementary objects exerting forces on each other, through to the more holistic concept of attractors towards which whole systems move, and to adaptive selection taking place in the context of an ecosystem. As for ‘top’ and ‘down’, in the present scientific context, these are clearly metaphorical, as some of the articles in this issue of the journal make clear. Do we therefore know what we are talking about? The meeting at the Royal Society on which this set of papers is based included philosophers as well as scientists, and some of those (Jeremy Butterfield, Barry Loewer, Alan Love, Samir Okasha and Eric Scerri) have contributed articles to this issue. We would like also to thank those (Claus Kiefer, Peter Menzies, Jerome Feldman and David Papineau) who contributed only to the discussion meeting. Their contributions were also valuable, both at the meeting and by influencing the articles that have been written by others. We include a glossary with this introduction, composed by one of us (O'Connor). The clarification of the use of words and their semantic frames is an important role of philosophy, and this was evident in the discussions at the meeting and is now evident in many of the articles published here. Moreover, philosophical analysis is not limited to the papers by the professional philosophers. The idea of top-down causation is intimately related to concepts of emergence; indeed, it is a key factor in strong theories of emergence.

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Identifying mental states from neural states under mental constraints

Cited by 7 publications

References 66 publications

Fluid convection, constraint and causation

Fluid convection, constraint and causation

Cognitive Neuroscience and Causal Inference: Implications for Psychiatry

Top-down causation: an integrating theme within and across the sciences?

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