Identity and Predication

Evans, Gareth

doi:10.2307/2025212

Cited by 93 publications

(38 citation statements)

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“…To claim that visually guided action can be based on predication implicit representation may be too radical as Evans (1975) has shown how limited linguistic communication would be without predication. However, visual perception of and action in one's immediate surroundings may be different because relations within one's egocentric space are much more constrained than relations between linguistically communicating partners.…”

Section: As a Point Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On Cussins ' (1929) view, NCC cannot be predicated of an external (conceptually identified) object (since NCC does not necessarily respect the boundaries of such objects). Consequently, NCC cannot have a truth value, because only expressions that predicate properties of individuals have a truth value (Evans 1975) in the classical sense of being able to derive contradictions. This view conforms with Brinck's characterisation of NCC as having correctness conditions without being able to have a truth value assigned.…”

Section: R13 Property-structure Predication and Non-conceptual Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing

Smith¹

1999

Behav Brain Sci

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Abstract:The implicit-explicit distinction is applied to knowledge representations. Knowledge is taken to be an attitude towards a proposition which is true. The proposition itself predicates a property to some entity. A number of ways in which knowledge can be implicit or explicit emerge. If a higher aspect is known explicitly then each lower one must also be known explicitly. This partial hierarchy reduces the number of ways in which knowledge can be explicit. In the most important type of implicit knowledge, representations merely reflect the property of objects or events without predicating them of any particular entity. The clearest cases of explicit knowledge of a fact are representations of one's own attitude of knowing that fact. These distinctions are discussed in their relationship to similar distinctions such as procedural-declarative, conscious-unconscious, verbalizable-nonverbalizable, direct-indirect tests, and automaticvoluntary control. This is followed by an outline of how these distinctions can be used to integrate and relate the often divergent uses of the implicit-explicit distinction in different research areas. We illustrate this for visual perception, memory, cognitive development, and artificial grammar learning.

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Section: As a Point Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: R13 Property-structure Predication and Non-conceptual Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representation and knowledge are not the same thing

Smith¹

1999

Behav Brain Sci

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“…38 Indeed, in his criticism of Quine in 'Identity and Predication ', Evans (1975) showed this to be the case, without expressly arguing for it. Within the Aufbau, the problem is not only that Carnap didn't sketch how to translate the connective 'is at' in statements of the form 'Quality q is at x ; y; z;t' into his initial language of elementary experiences and logic (Quine 1953, 40), and so failed to define temporal predicates in phenomenal and logical terms (Quine 1969a, 76).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In trying to make the best of Quine's semantics, however, Nelson (1997, 75-6) neglects three vital points: what is involved in extending Tarski's (1933) formal account of truth for deductive sciences to the non-formal domain of natural science, that the 'merist' view he provides for Quine (81ff.) unwittingly concedes much of Evans' (1975) criticism of Quine's semantics and that, despite his long-standing avowal of behaviourism and dismissal of propositional attitudes, Quine (1995aQuine ( , 2000Quine ( [2008, 497) had to accommodate them, however reluctantly. Implication, expressed by the universal conditional 'x (Fx e Gx)', generates structure generously, establishing an instance of 'Gx' for every established instance of 'Fx'.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars

Westphal

2015

JHAP

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This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism is untenable. The tension in Carnap’s semantics together with Quine’s exposure of the severe limits of radical empiricism illuminate central features of Sellars’s philosophy: the fully general form of the myth of givenness, together with Sellars’s alternative Kantian characterisation of understanding; the full significance of Carnap’s distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication, and its important methodological implications; the specifically pragmatic character of Sellars’s realism; and Sellars’s methodological reasons for holding that philosophy must be systematic and that systematic philosophy must be deeply historically and textually informed. This paper thus re-examines this recent episode of philosophical history for its philosophical benefits and systematic insights.

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“…This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter as to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quine's claim have been put forward in the past (see especially Evans, 1975;Fodor, 1993), and various patches have been suggested (e.g. Wright, 1997).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Gavagai again

Williams

2007

Synthese

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Quine (1960, ch.2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. 'Rabbit' might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the matter as to how reference is to be divided. Putative counterexamples to Quine's claim have been put forward in the past (see especially Evans, 1975;Fodor, 1993), and various patches have been suggested (e.g. Wright, 1997). One lacuna in this literature is that one does not find any detailed presentation of what exactly these interpretations are supposed to be.Drawing on contemporary literature on persistence, the present paper sets out detailed semantic treatments for fragments of English, whereby predicates such as 'rabbit' divide their reference over four-dimensional continuants (Quine's rabbits), instantaneous temporal slices of those continuants (Quine's rabbit-slices) and the simple elements which compose those slices (undetached rabbit parts) respectively. Once we have the systematic interpretations on the table, we can get to work evaluating them. * Thanks to

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Identity and Predication

Cited by 93 publications

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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing

Representation and knowledge are not the same thing

Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars

Gavagai again

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