Identity-Based Signatures for Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) Routing Protocols

Dearlove, Christopher

doi:10.17487/rfc7859

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Removing this one malicious router, once detected, implies rekeying all other routers in the MANET. Asymmetric keys, particularly when using identity-based signatures (such as those specified in [RFC7859]), may give the possibility of revoking single routers and verifying their identity based on the ICV itself.…”

Section: Inconsistent Topologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Threats to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2 (OLSRv2)

Clausen¹,

Herberg²,

Yi³

2017

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Section: Inconsistent Topologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Threats to the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol Version 2 (OLSRv2)

Clausen¹,

Herberg²,

Yi³

2017

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“…If, for example, it is used with a shared key (as per [RFC7183]), excluding single attackers generally is not aided by the use of ICVs. However, if routers have sufficient capabilities to support the use of asymmetric keys (as per [RFC7859]), part of addressing this challenge becomes one of providing key revocation in a way that does not in itself introduce additional vulnerabilities.…”

Section: Security Considerationsmentioning

confidence: 99%