Identity conflict and the paradox of embedded agency in the management accounting profession: Adding a new piece to the theoretical jigsaw

Horton, Kate; Wanderley, Cláudio de Araújo

doi:10.1016/j.mar.2016.06.002

Cited by 50 publications

(131 citation statements)

References 71 publications

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“…Contrary to the hypothesis proposed, opportunistic behaviors positively influence aggregation, perhaps because the party who intends to behave opportunistically also intends to hide relevant information from the other party (Wuyts and Geykens 2005;Horton and Wanderley 2018). The results also differ with respect to specific assets.…”

Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 77%

“…Opportunism poses a problem to the extent that a relationship receives support from specific assets that have limited values outside of the focal relationship (Williamson 1985). Opportunism might appear because one partner desires to behave in this manner or because the other partner cannot categorize that this one might behave opportunistically (Horton and Wanderley 2018). Williamson (1985) proposes not that all people continuously behave opportunistically, but rather that some partners will behave opportunistically at some moments and that it is not possible to predict who will behave in an opportunist way and who will not (Jack et al 2018).…”

Section: Opportunistic Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relational norms mitigate opportunistic behaviors, but they require resources such as money, time, and personnel (Joshi and Stump 1999a;Horton and Wanderley 2018). If firms establish these norms or behavior protocols by controlling resources, the norms' structure is weak, and the presence of opportunistic behaviors breaks their effectiveness (Dwyer and Oh 1987;Nyaga et al 2010).…”

Section: Opportunistic Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As the tightness (or strength) of relations between partners increases, asset specificity increases; then, opportunistic behaviors emerge from one party, and finally, resource control is necessary (Artz 1999). However, the resources that a firm expends on these specific assets might produce an advantage to one partner over the other, facilitating opportunistic behavior (Heide and Stump 1995;Horton and Wanderley 2018). In order to elude such behaviors and safeguard their investments, partners establish mechanisms to control the resources (Geyskens et al 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Makes Management Control Information Useful in Buyer–Supplier Relationships?

Ramón-Jerónimo

Flórez-López

2018

JRFM

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Abstract:Extensive research results in inconsistent findings regarding the advantages and risks of exchanging management control information in collaborative relationships between buyers and suppliers. This inconsistency is due, in part, to ignoring whether the information shared is useful. This study analyzes the influence of transaction characteristics (asset specificity, opportunistic behaviors, and resource control) on the usefulness of the format and the content of such sharing. Samples of purchasing and sales managers differ in how their assessment of this usefulness reflects the influence of transactional characteristics, as well as the format (timeliness, aggregation, and integration) and content (scope and symmetry) of the management control information itself.

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Section: Discussioncontrasting

confidence: 77%

Section: Opportunistic Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Opportunistic Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Makes Management Control Information Useful in Buyer–Supplier Relationships?

Ramón-Jerónimo

Flórez-López

2018

JRFM

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“…Recently, Englund and Gerdin (2018) has edited a special issue of Management Accounting Research that has been dedicated to study this paradox (Ahrens and Ferry, 2018;Hiebl, 2018;Horton and Wanderley, 2018). The first paper explores how a UK public sector organisation can act as an institutional entrepreneur.…”

Section: Giddens' Stmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradox of embedded agency from a strong structuration perspective

Kholeif

Jack

2019

QRAM

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This paper uses Stones' Strong Structuration Theory (SST) that combines Giddens' duality and Archer's analytical dualism to deal with the paradox of embedded agency, focussing on resistance, in the budgeting literature. It also applies this framework to an illustrative case study that examines a failed attempt to implement performance based budgeting (PBB) in the Egyptian Sales Tax Department (ESTD). Design/methodology/approach We have used SST as an analytical framework. Longitudinal case study data were collected from interviews, observations, discussions and documentary analysis, and from publicly available reports and other media issued by the World Bank. Findings The SST framework identifies the circumstances in which middle managers as embedded agency have limited possibilities to change their dispositions to act and identify opportunities for emancipation in the wider social context in which they are embedded. The official explanation for the failure to implement PBB in Egypt was obstruction by middle managers. The findings of this study provide an alternative explanation to that published by the World Bank for the failure to institutionalise PBB in Egypt. It was found that the middle managers were the real supporters of PBB. Other parties and existing laws and regulations contributed to the failure of PBB. Research limitations/implications As a practical implication of the study, the analysis presented here offers an alternative interpretation of the failure of the Egyptian project for monitoring and evaluation to that published by the World Bank. This case and similar cases may enhance our understanding of how and when monitoring and evaluation technologies should be introduced at the global level, in order to manage conflicts of interest between agencies and beneficiaries. Originality/value This paper contributes to the extant management accounting literature on the use of structuration theory in addressing the paradox of embedded agency in making or resisting structural change. It uses SST to integrate Giddens' structuration theory (ST) with critical realist theory, incorporating duality and dualism in a stronger model of structuration. The SST framework offers a means of analysing case studies that result from interactions and conjunctures between different groups of actors, at different ontological levels. The paper also examines the issue of embedded agency in budgeting research using an illustrative case study from a developing country, Egypt.

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Die Auswirkungen der Digitalisierung auf die Rolle des Controllers

Wolf

Heidlmayer

2019

Controlling – Aktuelle Entwicklungen Und Herausforderungen

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Identity conflict and the paradox of embedded agency in the management accounting profession: Adding a new piece to the theoretical jigsaw

Cited by 50 publications

References 71 publications

What Makes Management Control Information Useful in Buyer–Supplier Relationships?

What Makes Management Control Information Useful in Buyer–Supplier Relationships?

The paradox of embedded agency from a strong structuration perspective

Die Auswirkungen der Digitalisierung auf die Rolle des Controllers

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