In the literature elite-mass congruence is usually measured either in terms of issue preferences or in terms of left-right self-placement. The two forms of congruence are only occasionally used together and seldom were they used with the purpose of seeing if the levels of congruence were similar. With this intention we use Portugal as an extreme case (due to low level of clarity of party policy alternatives, and to relatively low levels of education, media exposure, and political interest). We found that in many situations the results for MPs-mass congruence were different depending on the use of left-right self-placement or substantive issue preferences.Keywords: political representation; left-right; ideology; Portugal.
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IntroductionThe empirical study of representation in democratic regimes has relied extensively upon the "responsible party model" and its normative implications (Miller and Stokes, 1963;Powell, 2000 and2004;Kitschelt et al, 1999;Miller et al, 1999;Thomassen, 1994;Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999a;Esaiasson and Holmberg, 1996; Wessels, 2007;Belchior, 2010; about the concept of representation, see Pitkin, 1976). This model points to some features about voters-parties' relations: 1) electors share various packages of issue positions; 2) electors compare their issue positions with the ones presented by the political competitors in each election; 3) electors vote for the party which presented the issue package which is closest to their own; finally, 4) once elected, the party officials in parliament, etc., remain united and trying harder to enact the issue package (they presented to the electorate) into public policy (Pierce, 1999: 9; Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999: 13-19).Although some voters in at least some occasions do in fact compare their issue positions with the ones presented by the parties, in order to decide how to vote, the truth is that this task is very demanding in terms of data collection and processing, and the benefits of the act of voting are not very high.1 Thus, most electors most of the time use shortcuts like the left-right divide to evaluate where the parties stand in terms of packages of issue positions, and also to evaluate how close the parties are to their (packages of) issue positions (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1992). Then they tend to vote in the party that is closest to their issue positions, although this is usually evaluated in terms of the appropriate short-cut: usually the left-right divide, in Europe, and the 1 Of course, this is only one theory about voting behaviour, which explains only a part of the variance in the vote and a part of the variance from country to country and from election to election. This is more likely to happen to more sophisticated voters and especially in occasions when the clarity of policy alternatives presented to voters by parties is higher.
4liberal-conservative schema, in the US. Moreover, to communicate with the voters, parties often use the language of left and right: to inform where they stand in terms of issue positions (Fuchs and Kl...