Ideological Extremism and Public Participation^*

Abstract

Objectives. Does aggregate ideological extremism reduce public participation? Does participation in governance processes fall when the social environment shifts to the extreme left or the extreme right of the political spectrum? Our main hypothesis is that the aggregate ideological orientation of the social environment constrains volunteerism in social regulatory programs. Methods. We test our hypothesis using a panel tobit analysis of data from the federal Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program. Results. Our model of public participation (expressed as volunteerism) shows that participation expands when the ideological position of a state's citizens is at the extreme left or right of the political continuum. We show the differential effects of two types of aggregate ideological orientation: of citizens and their political leaders. We further find that participation is greatest in states with extremely liberal citizen ideological positions. Conclusions. These findings paint a more complex picture of the effect of extremism in the social environment on public participation measured as production volunteerism. In sum, public participation is greatest when the social environment is ideologically polarized, and social regulation is strongest when volunteerism is greatest.

Disengaging elections? Political interest, number of elections, and turnout in elections to the European Parliament

“…Fourthly, I control for whether or not an individual identifies as ideologically extreme, measured as a dichotomous variable with responses on the left-right scale less than three or greater than seven considered extreme, with the rest coded as ideological moderates. Extreme ideologues should be more likely to turn out (Whitford et al., 2006). I also adjust for whether a voter identifies with a political party, which should increase the likelihood of voting (Larcinese, 2009).…”

Public Participation in Policing: The Impact of Citizen Oversight on the Incidence of Lethal Force over Time in the Largest U.S. Cities

“…The realization of any of the aforementioned benefits depends at least in part upon the role of the citizen oversight structure, but it is often assumed that a forum for the public to have their voices heard is an inherent benefit (Gissiner, 2001). While there are a number of scholars arguing for the value of deliberation in democratic societies (see Barber, 1984;Pateman, 1970;Gutmann & Thompson, 1996), there is also some evidence that public participation may have unintended consequences (see, e.g., Whitford, Yates, & Ochs, 2006) and in inadequate contexts may even have adverse effects (see Crain & Rosenthal, 1967;Sanders, 1997). However, institutions of participatory democratic governance that are adequately designed and properly implemented have the potential to facilitate citizen participation that generates innovative problem-solving (Fung, 2004).…”