Ideology Critique without Morality: A Radical Realist Approach

Abstract

What is the point of ideology critique? Prominent Anglo-American philosophers recently proposed novel arguments for the view that ideology critique is moral critique, and ideologies are flawed insofar as they contribute to injustice or oppression. We criticize that view and make the case for an alternative and more empirically oriented approach, grounded in epistemic rather than moral commitments. We make two related claims: (a) ideology critique can debunk beliefs and practices by uncovering how, empirically, they are produced by self-justifying power and (b) the self-justification of power should be understood as an epistemic rather than moral flaw. Drawing on the recent realist revival in political theory, we argue that this genealogical approach has more radical potential, despite being more parsimonious than morality-based approaches. We demonstrate the relative advantages of our view by discussing the results of empirical studies on the contemporary phenomenon of neopatriarchy in the Middle East and North Africa.

Fact-Centric Political Theory, Three Ways: Normative Behaviourism, Grounded Normative Theory, and Radical Realism

“…Radical realism, at least in the variant I wish to focus on here (Aytac and Rossi, 2022; Rossi, 2019; Rossi Forthcoming, 2024; Rossi and Argenton, 2021), is a form of ideology critique grounded in epistemic rather than moral normativity. The rough idea is to critique the epistemic consequences of observable patterns of power self-justification.…”

“… 1. This describes the ideology critique-centric version of radical realism I have developed with a number of colleagues (e.g. Aytac, 2022; Prinz and Rossi, 2017; Rossi, 2019; Rossi and Argenton, 2021, and, most comprehensively to date, Aytac and Rossi, 2022). Other variants exist (e.g.…”

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Political Normativity

“…The challenge for realists, then, is to show that it is possible to make normative judgments about politics by using non-moral (and not 4 For instance, there is a clear-cut conflation of distinctively political normativity and nonmoral political normativity in Sleat's recent defence of realism against Leader Maynard and Worsnip's argument, where he claims that radical realism needs to rely on distinctively political normativity (2021, section 2)-whereas most radical realists rely on epistemic normativity (e.g. Prinz & Rossi 2017, Rossi & Argenton 2021, Aytac & Rossi 2021. Unsurprisingly, it is mostly liberal realists who claim that more radical forms of realism that reject morality in politics altogether fall prey to Leader Maynard and Worsnip's critique (Sleat 2021, but also Bagg 2022).…”

“…8 In another recent critique of realism, Sam Kiss also focuses on distinctively political normativity, and so ends up distinguishing between realism and prudentialism-but also acknowledging the correctness of longstanding 'radical realist' current, some of whose exponents explicitly rely on epistemic normativity alone: the rough idea there is that empirical evidence can be mustered to show that some normative beliefs about political power structures are caused by those very structures, and so lack epistemic warrant due to vicious circularity (e. Note, though, that epistemic normativity does not yield strict prescriptions. It is an evaluative normative theory, not a prescriptive normative theory (Rossi 2019, Aytac & Rossi 2021). 9 A moralist may take this to be a disadvantage of realism vis-à-vis moralism.…”

“…Rosen 1996). Even as ideology critique comes back to the fore in this tradition, it is predominantly driven by moral concerns, unlike in the Marxist tradition (Aytac & Rossi 2021). 18 On trade-offs between political and moral normativity see Burelli 2020.…”