Ideology, Party Factionalism and Policy Change: An integrated dynamic theory

Abstract

Operationalized as a simulation and checked against 1,737 policy shifts in twenty-four post-war democracies, this theory of party position-taking offers both an explanation and specific postdictions of party behaviour, synthesizing some previous approaches and linking up with mandate theories of political representation. These wider implications are considered at the beginning and the end of the article. , Mapping Policy Preferences II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Both books are sold with attached CDs containing documentation and data. As we use these for our own analysis, they are described in detail below. 8 The Manifesto dataset and the construction of the left-right scale, which we use in our own analysis, are described in more detail in our data section below. The claim of the scale to provide the best summary representation of public and party policy is buttressed by the spontaneous emergence of a powerful leading left-right dimension from factor analyses of the Manifesto data reported in Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek J. Hearl, eds, Ideology, Strategy and Party Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge

When Extremism Pays: Policy Positions, Voter Certainty, and Party Support in Postcommunist Europe

“…They further suggest that the spatial modeling framework helps us understand electoral competition not only in advanced but also in newer democracies (see also Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009). More specifically, our results have important implications for party strategies in relatively new democracies (Budge 1994;Laver 2005; see also Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010). In these democraciescharacterized by unstable party systems (Birch 2003;Powell and Tucker 2013;Rose and Mishler 2010;van Biezen 2003;Tavits 2005), uncertainty about how election outcomes are translated into governing coalitions (Druckman and Roberts 2007;Grzymala-Busse 2001;Tzelgov 2011), and uncertainty about how governing coalitions formulate policy-citizens reward parties that present extreme party positions, because these parties are more successful at communicating clear policy stances than moderate parties.…”

Moderate as Necessary: The Role of Electoral Competitiveness and Party Size in Explaining Parties’ Policy Shifts

“…Robertson (1976) regards policy moderation as the strategy that follows from parties' vote-and office-seeking motives, while policy-seeking leads to more extreme positions. The anticipated competitiveness of elections then determines which of these preferences (represented by the rivalry between party leaders and activists) becomes dominant (see also Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald, 2010). In the run-up to the British 2005 election, for example, Tony Blair referred to the "toughness" of the upcoming election in order to woo disaffected party activists, who felt that Labour had moved too far to the right in its stance on immigration and crime.…”

Polarizers or landscape groomers? An empirical analysis of party donations by the 100 largest German companies in 1984–2005

“…Power resource theorists provide good reasons why firms should favour the political camp on the right side of the party spectrum. The left -right distinction originated in the conflict between labour and capital, and comparative policy research confirms that left and right governments differ with respect to (re-)distributive policies, in particular welfare state policies (Huber and Stephens, 2001; see also Budge et al, 2010 on the incentives that parties face to remain distinctive). In times of extraordinary competitive pressures (such as those deriving from globalization), the willingness to polarize along the left -right axis should be particularly pronounced.…”