2015
DOI: 10.1177/0959354315569832
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If intelligence is a cause, it is a within-subjects cause

Abstract: Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden argue that latent variables such as intelligence should be given a between-subjects causal interpretation, but not a within-subjects causal interpretation. That is, while intelligence is a cause of one subject’s doing better than another on an IQ test, there is no non-comparative sense in which intelligence – as standardly measured – is a cause of an individual’s performance. Here I expand upon Pearl’s discussion of Simpson’s paradox to show that there cannot be a cause i… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…In this experiment there is no variation within the individual-they are either in the experimental or control group. The results, however, are direct estimates of within-subject treatment effects, despite the fact that they are between-subjects' estimates (Weinberger, 2015).…”
Section: Between-and Within-subjects Modelingmentioning
confidence: 78%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In this experiment there is no variation within the individual-they are either in the experimental or control group. The results, however, are direct estimates of within-subject treatment effects, despite the fact that they are between-subjects' estimates (Weinberger, 2015).…”
Section: Between-and Within-subjects Modelingmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Via extrapolation from Simpson's paradox, there cannot be a cause within a population that is also not a cause within a subpopulation; the reason, such a statistical result may appear, is due to an improper formulation of covariation as causation, along with appropriate effect modifiers (Pearl, 2009). If we grant that individuals can count as subpopulations, it then follows that there can be no causal effect in a population that is also not a causal effect within at least one of its members (see Weinberger, 2015 for the elaboration of this argument). 3 For a concrete example, suppose we run an intervention where we randomly assign people to control or to working memory training groups.…”
Section: Between-and Within-subjects Modelingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is why, more generally, the question of whether an effect averages over heterogeneous populations is orthogonal to whether it is a genuine effect. To the extent that we can measure average effects in heterogeneous populations, it is because this effect averages over the total effects for the individuals in that population (Weinberger, 2015). What matters are an individual's outcomes for counterfactual values of the treatment, rather than whether there is actual variation among individuals.…”
Section: Path-specific Effects and Probabilistic Causalitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We need not adopt a realist or an instrumentalist view on latent variables to appreciate the point that theoretical criteria, formulated in terms of such latents, can be replaced by causal assumptions and intervention data. Similarly, the insightful discussion in Weinberger ( 2015 ) on latents and ideal interventions is relevant but not crucial: our points do not hinge on the interventions on latents being ideal.…”
mentioning
confidence: 90%