Don Ihde’s postphenomenological theory of technological relations has proven its value for understanding the role material artifacts play in our lives. However influential it may be, some of his key concepts have remained ambiguous. In this paper, we analyze and critically evaluate how Ihde describes one of these concepts, namely, alterity relation (Alterity). Alterity describes how technologies appear to subjects as humanlike others, or, as Ihde calls them, quasi-others. We identify and discuss three key problems with Ihde’s account of Alterity, namely, objectness, focality, and continuum. We argue that an overarching issue is prevalent in his account of Alterity: a subtle and possibly unintended emphasis on the subject’s role in constituting technological otherness. This emphasis runs counter to the interrelational ontological foundations of postphenomenology. Moreover, it hinders postphenomenological research from fully addressing the ethical and moral dimensions of its framework. By clarifying these problems, we aim to provide a fruitful groundwork for further reconsiderations of the framework’s key concepts and for the improvement of postphenomenological investigations concerning the nature of artifacts: our multifaceted engagements with, in and through them.