II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?

Milne, Peter

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00182.x

Cited by 19 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…The considerations Sextus provided showed that to be a vain hope. See also the exchange between Milne (2009) andField (2009). in Euclid for example-should give us pause about the idea that people don't use explosive inferences. 8 As we have seen, the second argument has the form of an inference to best explanation: people use inconsistent theories as interesting and productive so the best explanation of their inferential behaviour is that their theories must not be closed under classical consequence.…”

Section: The Abductive Argumentmentioning

confidence: 95%

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

Michael

2015

Synthese

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Priest and others have presented their "most telling" argument for paraconsistent logic: that only paraconsistent logics allow non-trivial inconsistent theories. This is a very prevalent argument; occurring as it does in the work of many relevant and more generally paraconsistent logicians. However this argument can be shown to be unsuccessful. There is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of non-triviality. Disambiguated the most telling reason for paraconsistent logics is either question-begging or mistaken. This highlights an important confusion about the role of logic in our development of our theories of the world. Does logic chart good reasoning or our commitments? We also consider another abductive argument for paraconsistent logics which also is shown to fail.

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Section: The Abductive Argumentmentioning

confidence: 95%

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

Michael

2015

Synthese

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“…I begin by introducing a distinction between different types of normative roles that logic might be thought to perform. I show that the type of first‐personal normative role Harman is concerned with differs from the third‐personal normative roles other contributors to the debate have in mind (Field (, 2014), MacFarlane (), Milne (), Streumer ()). Therefore, Harman and the other contributors to the debate—the merit of their contributions notwithstanding—are not addressing the same question and so are failing to engage with one another.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“… As far as I can tell, this second aspect of Harman's challenge has been largely ignored by his respondents, (Field (), Milne (), MacFarlane (), Streumer (). …”

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confidence: 99%

Consequence and Normative Guidance

Steinberger

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap.To bridge the gap one would need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, i.e. a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper I argue that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. I show how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well-motivated desiderata. Moreover, I argue that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, I develop a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive. *I am grateful to

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“…As it happens, I very much doubt that there is a knowledge norm for belief , for one can retract an assertion saying, ‘I don't have much evidence for that, but I still believe it’ (cf. Milne , p. 281; MacFarlane , 83–84). But the point is that assertion could be governed by a norm – perhaps more than one – but neither it nor any other is constitutive of assertion.…”

Section: Macfarlane's Survey Of Answers To the Question ‘What Is Assementioning

confidence: 99%

Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion

Milne

2012

Dialectica

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Starting from John MacFarlane's recent survey of answers to the question 'What is assertion?', I defend an account of assertion that draws on elements of MacFarlane's and Robert Brandom's commitment accounts, Timothy Williamson's knowledge norm account, and my own previous work on the normative status of logic. I defend the knowledge norm from recent attacks. Indicative conditionals, however, pose a problem when read along the lines of Ernest Adams' account, an account supported by much work in the psychology of reasoning. Furthermore, there seems to be no place for degrees of belief in the accounts of belief and assertion given here. Degrees of belief do have a role in decision-making, but, again, there is much evidence that the orthodox theory of subjective utility maximization is not a good description of what we do in decision-making and, arguably, neither is it a good normative guide to how we ought to make decisions

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II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?

Cited by 19 publications

References 20 publications

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

On a “most telling” argument for paraconsistent logic

Consequence and Normative Guidance

Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion

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