Ii*-the End of Philosophy (The Case of Hobbes)

Abstract

In the first three sections, I argue that Hobbes has a distinctive conception of philosophy, the highest value of which is not truth, but human benefit; and that his philosophical utterances are constrained by this value (both insofar as they are philosophical in particular, and insofar as they are public utterances of any kind). I address an evidentiary problem for this view in the penultimate section, and then turn to the question of how such a conception of philosophy requires different interpretations of particular philosophical positions. The whole is intended as a case study of the need for an interpreter to understand how the interpreted philosopher conceives of the nature and aim of his undertaking.

The Unity of Hobbes’s Philosophy: Science, Politics, and God?

“…One explanation is to suppose Hobbes is simulating. Textual evidence confirms Hobbes's prima facie endorsement of simulation in De Cive, Leviathan, and De Homine [26]. 23 Theist defenders wishing to sidestep Jesseph's objections, while avoiding the hermeneutical problems associated with esoteric debates, are probably better off prioritizing the autonomy thesis.…”

“…This methodological convergence of the two texts lends support for the unity thesis [27]. 25 Hobbes suggests that "the skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules [28], 26 as doth Arithmetique and Geometry . .…”

“…First, Hobbes never intends to publish Answer, which is supported in Hobbes's correspondence. Even Bramhall confirms his reluctance to publish it, and so reluctance is needed before considering it as part of his intended system [26] (p. 54). Because Gorham relies on this text, he is constrained to adopt either a very weak version of the unity thesis, or the autonomy thesis.…”

“…The unity thesis still advocates the need to account for what Hobbes says about his corporeal God. However, because Answer is a late text that Hobbes intended to remain private [26] (p. 54), interpretive latitude seems permissible. It is possible that Hobbes simply changes his mind this late in the game.…”

“…39 Now, there is plenty of evidence that Hobbes condoned deception to promote peace and avoid the perils of war. Kinch Hoekstra remarks that "Hobbes himself recommends that a 'wise man should so write' that he is understood on one level by all, and on a deeper level by the wise" [26] (p. 41). Berman maintains the same line as Jesseph, defending what he calls the "crypto-atheist hypothesis" [4] (p. 65).…”