Illusory Gains from Chile's Targeted School Voucher Experiment

Feigenberg, Benjamin; Rivkin, Steven G.; Yan, Rui

doi:10.1093/ej/uez023

Cited by 11 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…SEP not responsible for test-score gains. Feigenberg, Rivkin, and Yan (2017) present several pieces of evidence in support of their conclusion that SEP was not responsible for increases in the relative test scores of low-SES students after 2007. First, they show that the additional funds SEP provided to participating schools had only a modest effect on measured inputs.…”

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confidence: 78%

“…Test-score gains did not mean stronger cognitive skills. Feigenberg, Rivkin, and Yan (2017) present two types of evidence in support of their conclusion that the gains from SEP were "illusory." First, they show that the increases in the relative scores of low-SES students on lowstakes tests taken in 8 th grade were only half as large as the increases in the relative scores on the quite high-stakes grade-4 tests.…”

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confidence: 89%

“…These strategies focus on how resources are used rather than on which inputs are purchased (Banerjee et al, 2007;Fryer, 2014). Feigenberg, Rivkin, and Yan (2017) also point out that the test score gap did not decline more in the years after 2007 for low-SES students enrolled in schools that participated in SEP than for low-SES students enrolled in non-participating schools. This evidence is consistent with SEP making a difference.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Consequences of Educational Voucher Reform in Chile

Murnane

Waldman²,

Willett³

et al. 2017

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work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. In an effort to boost student achievement and reduce income-based gaps, the Chilean government passed the Preferential School Subsidy Law (SEP) in 2008, which altered the nation's 27-year-old universal school-voucher system dramatically. Implementation of SEP increased the value of the school voucher by 50 percent for "priority students", primarily those whose family incomes fell within the bottom 40 percent of the national distribution. To be eligible to accept the higher-valued vouchers from these students, schools were required to waive fees for Priority students and to participate in an accountability system. We addressed these RQs by fitting a sequence of multi-level interrupted time-series regression models, supplemented by other descriptive analyses. We found that:1. On average, student test scores increased markedly and income-based gaps in those scores declined by one-third in the five years after the passage of SEP.2. The combination of increased support of schools and accountability was the critical mechanism through which the implementation of SEP increased student scores, especially in schools serving high concentrations of low-income students. Migration of lowincome students from public schools to private voucher schools played a small role.We conclude by responding to a recent paper by Feigenberg, Rivkin, and Yan (2017) that argues that the gains from SEP are illusory. *The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments on earlier drafts provided

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confidence: 78%

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confidence: 89%

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confidence: 99%

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The Consequences of Educational Voucher Reform in Chile

Murnane

Waldman²,

Willett³

et al. 2017

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“…The introduction of SEP spurred a cottage industry of research to identify the effects of the policy on different outcomes, which has fueled an ongoing debate about the merits of the reform. Most of the research has focused on the effect of the reform on student achievement, consistently finding a positive effect on learning and the narrowing of the socioeconomic achievement gap (Murnane, Waldman, Willett, Bos, & Vegas, 2017;Feigenberg, Rivkin, & Yan, 2017), though there is still debate on the magnitude of the effects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of the Chilean School Accountability System on Teacher Turnover

Elacqua¹,

Hincapié²,

Martínez³

2019

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Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail. Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.

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“…See for instanceAbdulkadiroglu et al (2014). 10 For recent work on Chile seeFeigenberg et al (2014), Navarro-Palau (2017),Neilson (2017), and Aguirre (2018). Related to this MacLeod and Urquiola (2015) note that the use of lotteries-as is done in American charter schools-may render value added more transparent and increase the likelihood that it drives school choice.…”

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confidence: 99%

Is Education Consumption or Investment? Implications for School Competition

MacLeod

Urquiola

2019

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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Milton Friedman argued that giving parents freedom to choose schools would improve education. His argument was simple and compelling because it extended results from markets for consumer goods to education. We review the evidence, which yields surprisingly mixed results on Friedman's prediction. A key reason is that households often seem to choose schools based on their absolute achievement rather than their value added. We show that this can be rational in a model based on three ingredients that economists have highlighted since Friedman worked on the issue. First, education is an investment into human capital. Second, labor markets can feature wage premia: Individuals of a given skill level may receive higher wages if they match to more productive firms. Third, distance influences school choice and the placements that schools produce. These factors imply that choice alone is too crude a mechanism to ensure the effective provision of schooling.

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Illusory Gains from Chile's Targeted School Voucher Experiment

Cited by 11 publications

References 24 publications

The Consequences of Educational Voucher Reform in Chile

The Consequences of Educational Voucher Reform in Chile

The Effects of the Chilean School Accountability System on Teacher Turnover

Is Education Consumption or Investment? Implications for School Competition

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