Images contain what the imager put there: A nonreplication of illusions in imagery

Reisberg, Daniel; Morris, Anne M.

doi:10.3758/bf03329863

Cited by 11 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Since that study was reported there have been a series of studies and arguments concerning whether images could be visually (re)interpreted. Reisberg and Chambers (1991) and Reisberg and Morris (1985) used a variety of standard reversal figures and confirmed the Chambers and Reisberg finding that mental images of these figures could not reverse. took issue with these findings, citing their own experiments involving operations over images (mentioned above); but, as I suggested, it is dubious that the reinterpretation of their simple familiar figures should be counted as a visual reinterpretation.…”

Section: Extracting Novel Information From Images: Visual (Re)perceptsupporting

confidence: 56%

“…Many of these studies have serious methodological problems, which we will not discuss here in detail. For example, a number of investigators have raised questions about many of these illusions (Predebon & Wenderoth 1985;Reisberg & Morris 1985) where the likelihood of experimenter demand is high. The usual precautions against experimenter influence on this highly subjective measure were not taken (e.g., the experiments were not done using a double-blind procedure).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Mental imagery: In search of a theory

2002

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is special, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. Finally, I consider whether recent neuroscience evidence clarifies the debate over the nature of mental images. I claim that when such questions as whether images are depictive or spatial are formulated more clearly, the evidence does not provide support for the picture-theory over a symbol-structure theory of mental imagery. Even if all the empirical claims were true, they do not warrant the conclusion that many people have drawn from them: that mental images are depictive or are displayed in some (possibly cortical) space. Such a conclusion is incompatible with what is known about how images function in thought. We are then left with the provisional counterintuitive conclusion that the available evidence does not support rejection of what I call the “null hypothesis”; namely, that reasoning with mental images involves the same form of representation and the same processes as that of reasoning in general, except that the content or subject matter of thoughts experienced as images includes information about how things would look.

show abstract

Section: Extracting Novel Information From Images: Visual (Re)perceptsupporting

confidence: 56%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental imagery: In search of a theory

2002

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This explains why subjects who image the duck/rabbit reliably fail to reconstrue it, but subjects who perceive the duck/rabbit routinely reinterpret the shape (Chambers & Reisberg, 1985). This contrast, we believe, derives from the presence of a stimulus in perception, i.e.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

“Enacted” Auditory Images are Ambiguous; “Pure” Auditory Images are Not

Reisberg

Smith

Baxter

et al. 1989

The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Previous research indicates that visual images are inherently unambiguous. The present study extends this argument to auditory imagery. In Experiment 1, subjects were able to reinterpret an imaged ambiguous auditory figure, but covert subvocalization apparently aided this reinterpretation. When subvocalization was blocked, reinterpretations were eliminated. Experiments 2 and 3 generalize this finding to different procedures and stimuli. Experiment 4 explores further the role of subvocalization, by showing that the likelihood of reinterpreting an imaged stimulus is directly proportional to the degree of enactment allowed. We argue that subvocalization or enactment provides an internal stimulus that is subject to reinterpretation. Without enactment, the "pure" auditory image is as unambiguous as a visual image. Thus, in both visual and auditory modalities, images come into being as representations and so are inherently meaningful.

show abstract

“…Wallace (1984) reported similar findings with the Ponzo, Wundt and Hering illusions. These experiments depend on the subjects making subjective reports about subtle changes in the appearance of the stimulus, and the results can plausibly be discounted as the result of experimental demand (Predebon & Wenderoth, 1985;Reisberg & Morris, 1985). However, the experimental design used by Pressey and Wilson (1974) to demonstrate that a version of the Poggendorff illusion can be induced through imagery is not nearly so vulnerable to this sort of criticism; neither is that used by Kosslyn, Sukel, and Bly (1999, expt. 3) to demonstrate an imagery version of the "oblique effect".…”

Section: §24 the Empirical Standing Of The Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content

Thomas

1999

Cognitive Science

190

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi‐pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the “traditional” symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non‐discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non‐discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.

show abstract

Images contain what the imager put there: A nonreplication of illusions in imagery

Cited by 11 publications

References 11 publications

Mental imagery: In search of a theory

Mental imagery: In search of a theory

“Enacted” Auditory Images are Ambiguous; “Pure” Auditory Images are Not

Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About