Abstract. A central finding in experimental research identified with Embodied Cognition (EC) is that understanding actions involves their embodied simulation, i.e. executing some processes involved in performing these actions. Extending these findings, I argue that reenactment -the overt embodied simulation of actions and practices, including especially communicative actions and practices, within utterances -makes it possible to forge an integrated EC-based account of linguistic meaning. In particular, I argue: (a) that remote entities can be referred to by reenacting actions performed with them; (b) that the use of grammatical constructions can be conceived of as the reenactment of linguistic action routines; (c) that complex enunciational structures (reported speech, irony, etc.) involve a separate level of reenactment, on which characters are presented as interacting with one another within the utterance; (d) that the segmentation of long utterances into shorter units involves the reenactment of brief audience interventions between units; and (e) that the overall meaning of an utterance can be stated in reenactment terms. The notion of reenactment provides a conceptual framework for accounting for aspects of language that are usually thought to be outside the reach of EC in an EC framework, thus supporting a view of meaning and linguistic content as thoroughly grounded in action and interaction. Keywords: action; cognitive linguistics; dialogue; embodied cognition; meaning; simulation. 1 Language has often been viewed as the epitome of abstract cognition, as formal logical calculus in thin disguise. Accordingly, in the debates around embodied cognition (EC) and embodied social cognition, 1 raging in cognitive science today, the supposedly disembodied nature of language and meaning -abstract concepts, logical syntactic rules, etc. -counts against EC.EC-based and related approaches instead tend to view language as a tool of human action and interaction (e.g. Tylén et al. 2010). However, these approaches face a challenge when dealing with linguistic content: if we view utterances consistently as actions, how do we account for the meanings of their parts (e.g. words, phrases) and for the relation between the meanings of these parts and the meaning of a whole utterance in action terms? This challenge Furthermore, the proposed framework can be extended to phenomena that received little attention in EC and cognitive linguistic literature. I will particularly focus on reference to remote objects and complex enunciational structures, such as reported speech and irony.These linguistic theories and phenomena are discussed in the latter part of the paper.Before that, a more detailed discussion is due of the notion of reenactment itself, its connection to EC, and the conception of meaning it presumes. 1 I will address social cognition only in the basic sense of meaningfully interacting with others, ignoring issues that have to do with the so-called "theory of mind". 2 I am thus following a programme akin to that of Gal...