2012
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.04.009
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IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention

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Cited by 34 publications
(27 citation statements)
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References 94 publications
(132 reference statements)
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“…Despite the IMF's greater acceptance of the temporary use of capital controls by borrowers facing a high risk of capital flight, the existing literature remains divided over the extent to which changes in IMF conditionality since the onset of the Great Recession substantiate a transformational shift in the organization's policy paradigm (Grabel ; Joyce ; Lütz and Kranke ; Presbitero and Zazzaro ). The IMF has reformed its loan programs and how conditionality is applied for borrowers with strong macroeconomic policy track records.…”
Section: Continuity and Change In Imf Policy Advice To Borrowersmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Despite the IMF's greater acceptance of the temporary use of capital controls by borrowers facing a high risk of capital flight, the existing literature remains divided over the extent to which changes in IMF conditionality since the onset of the Great Recession substantiate a transformational shift in the organization's policy paradigm (Grabel ; Joyce ; Lütz and Kranke ; Presbitero and Zazzaro ). The IMF has reformed its loan programs and how conditionality is applied for borrowers with strong macroeconomic policy track records.…”
Section: Continuity and Change In Imf Policy Advice To Borrowersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Accepting the use of capital controls by borrowers such as Iceland in 2008 and Cyprus in 2013 represents a significant move away from the IMF's championing of capital account liberalization as a global policy norm during the 1990s (Gallagher 2014;Leiteritz and Moschella 2010;Moschella 2010). Despite the IMF's greater acceptance of the temporary use of capital controls by borrowers facing a high risk of capital flight, the existing literature remains divided over the extent to which changes in IMF conditionality since the onset of the Great Recession substantiate a transformational shift in the organization's policy paradigm (Grabel 2011;Joyce 2012;Lütz and Kranke 2014;Presbitero and Zazzaro 2012). The IMF has reformed its loan programs and how conditionality is applied for borrowers with strong macroeconomic policy track records.…”
Section: Continuity and Change In Imf Policy Advice To Borrowersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dreher and Jensen (2007) have also established a statistical relationship between G7 voting at the UN General Assembly and IMF conditionality. Similarly, Presbitero et al (2012) found that during the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2010, the IMF tended to allocate more toward countries where G7 multinationals and financial systems were exposed.…”
Section: Powerful Statesmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…Indeed, the ILO and World Bank, which are often tasked with responding to these crises (Presbitero & Zazzaro, 2012), have made some effort toward gathering more comprehensive data on how states and labor groups responded to the 2008 financial crisis (ILO/World Bank, 2012;Tajgman, Saget, Elkin, & Gravel, 2011).…”
Section: Predicted Value Of Labor Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%