IMF Structural Conditionality: How Much Is Too Much?

Abstract

for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Trond Augdal for superb research assistance. I also want to thank Stanley Fischer and his colleagues at the IMF for sharing with me the Fund's data on structural conditions in Fund programs. 2

Implementation in East Asia

“…These are in addition to the standard macro-and micro-economic requirements of the early 1990s. This vast new agenda was clearly reflected in the various structural conditionalities attached to the IMF-led rescue packages for Thailand, Indonesia and Korea (Kapur 2001;Goldstein 2001). …”

Economic Reform, Social Welfare, and Instability: Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, 1983–2004

“…This In many other regions of the world especially in Latin America and subSaharan Africa, such programs which were undertaken in the 1980s and the 1990s have resulted in a decline in social welfare (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1987;Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1995) and growing inequalities (Stiglitz, 2002;Dunkley, 1997;Goldstein, 2000;Stewart, 2000;CAFOD, 1998). However, the same phenomenon has received little attention in MENA.…”

Sovereign Risk Management in Recession: The Cases of Sweden and China

“…The sovereign would have to follow terms raised by rescuers. These terms often includes deficit cut and tightening policies during recession period, a specified repayment plan as well (Morris, 2001). It means a country's policy decisions will be influenced severely by abroad power.…”