The sensorimotor theory of infancy has been overthrown, but there is little consensus on a replacement. We hypothesize that a capacity for representation is the starting point for infant development, not its culmination. Logical distinctions are drawn between object representation, identity, and permanence. Modern experiments on early object permanence and deferred imitation suggest: (a) even for young infants, representations persist over breaks in sensory contact, (b) numerical identity of objects (Os) is initially specified by spatiotemporal criteria (place and trajectory), (c) featural and functional identity criteria develop, (d) events are analyzed by comparing representations to current perception, and (e) representation operates both prospectively, anticipating future contacts with an O, and retrospectively, reidentifying an O as the "same one again." A model of the architecture and functioning of the early representational system is proposed. It accounts for young infants' behavior toward absent people and things in terms of their efforts to determine the identity of objects. Our proposal is developmental without denying innate structure and elevates the power of perception and representation while being cautious about attributing complex concepts to young infants.
Keywordsrepresentation; object identity; object permanence; imitation; cognitive development; memory The field of infant psychology is in crisis. There is no longer a shared framework or set of assumptions about the nature of infancy. This crisis has been brewing for about 30 years. It began with the overthrow of the view that the infant is a purely sensorimotor organism. It continues today because there is no new consensus on how we should conceive of the infant mind.The classical sensorimotor view of infancy was founded on two key assumptions. The first was that there was a primacy to the role of action. In early infancy, to "know" an object was to act upon it. Development derived from relating actions to one another and to consequences in the perceptual world (sensorymotor connections). The second assumption was that a lack of sensory contact, in particular invisibility, was an insurmountable problem Copyright © 1998 Ablex Publishing Corporation Andrew N. Meltzoff, Department of Psychology, Box 357920, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195. 7 Unlike Experiment 1, there were no problems of motor noise correlated with the one-vs. two-object movements, nor surface similarities between the habituation and test displays to serve as a basis for generalization (Spelke et al., 1995, p. 123
NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript for young infants. When sensory contact with objects was lost, objects ceased to exist for the infant. The eventual development of representation was postulated as the way children transcended stimulus-driven reactions and escaped the tyranny of the here-and-now world of infancy. Piaget provided a detailed theory of this kind (Piaget, 1952(Piaget, , 1954(Piaget, , 1962.The ...