Foreign animal diseases (FADs), such as highly pathogenic avian influenza or foot and mouth disease (FMD; a worst‐case FAD), are documented threats, whether through accidental or intentional exposures. US policies, as with most countries where an FAD is not endemic, follow ‘Stamping Out/Eradication’ (SOE) protocols if it is found: Affected herds are rapidly destroyed to eradicate the agent and quickly resume export trade. While historically effective in eradicating disease, SOE goals and techniques no longer represent a sole source solution to disease events affecting western agriculture. For instance, [1] their focus on international trade is inappropriate; [2] their assumptions on the nature of such outbreaks are incorrect; [3] new technologies are not included; and [4] their unintended consequences are huge. These errors can result in responses that, in modern concentrated agricultural markets, may cause such damage that markets will not recover. In short, in our drive to protect agriculture, we may actually destroy it.
A factor missing from most FAD planning is an in‐depth consideration of how agriculture will cope
during
an outbreak and how it will
recover
(e.g. business continuity). We must re‐evaluate plans to ensure that the event and all its consequences are managed as opposed to blindly eradicating a disease agent at great cost. By addressing the true threats FADs pose to today's agriculture, we will lessen the effects of natural or accidental FAD outbreaks, and will make FADs less attractive as bioterror tools.