Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy

Miller, Banks; Keith, Linda Camp; Holmes, Jennifer S.

doi:10.9783/9780812290370

Cited by 36 publications

(82 citation statements)

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“…We control for language spoken. We expect that English speakers may be more likely to get relief because they can better understand the process, advocate for themselves and because it may be that IJs see them as less likely to be a potential burden on the state (Rottman et al ; Holmes and Keith 2010; Keith et al ; Miller et al ). We also control for Arabic speakers with mixed expectations.…”

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We expect that this variable will have a strong negative impact on the likelihood of receiving relief, as those in detention or who have been previously detained will have a more difficult time advocating on their own behalf (Ramji‐Nogales et al ) and may be viewed with more suspicion by IJs. We also measure the elapsed time (in months) from the beginning of our dataset (1990), to control for the strong time trends that are present in asylum data (Keith et al ; Keith et al forthcoming; Miller et al ) . From the applicant's country of origin, we are able to control for a variety of country‐specific factors that can signal whether or not an individual's well‐founded fear claim is credible.…”

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We control for the material and security interests of the United States that are known to influence asylum policy and decisions (i.e., Rosenblum and Salehyan ; Holmes and Keith 2010; Keith et al ; Miller et al ). Historically, applicants from trading partners and allies are less likely to receive asylum, all things considered.…”

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We include other national level control variables that affect IJs' willingness to grant asylum (Holmes and Keith 2010; Keith et al ; Miller et al ). First, we include the monthly national unemployment rate (lagged one month, Bureau of Labor Statistics).…”

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Past research has shown that aliens who apply for asylum within the U.S. immigration courts with the assistance of legal counsel have a much greater chance of being granted asylum than do aliens who petition without the aid of an attorney (Keith, Homes, and Miller et al ; McKeown and McLeod ; Miller et al ; Ramji‐Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag , ). This fact has engendered a serious push for reform, including movement toward a Gideon ‐like rule for asylum cases.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical Capability

2015

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How much does attorney quality influence the outcome of cases in which one litigant is significantly more capable than the other? Using a unique dataset of all asylum merits decision from 1990 to 2010, we find that high quality representation evens the odds for asylum applicants and that not being represented by legal counsel is actually better than being represented by a poor lawyer. In this analysis, we draw on a modified party capability theory and create new measures of attorney capability. We find that variation in attorney capability is a primary driver of the disparity in asylum outcomes in U.S. immigration courts and that a likely causal mechanism for this influence is the judge‐specific reputation of an attorney.

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Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attorney Capability Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical Capability

2015

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Introduction

Dahlvik¹

2018

IMISCOE Research Series

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Electronic Surveillance in Immigration Court: Evidence from the CalGang Database

Muñiz,

Owens

2024

Crit Crim

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Through a mixed-methods approach that draws on over 4000 pages of organizational documents and two quantitative data sets from federal and state entities, the authors ask, has the growth of electronic surveillance by local criminal justice agencies, with corresponding database interoperability and information sharing, changed how federal agencies—specifically immigration agencies—operate? We focus on the CalGang Database, California’s statewide gang intelligence database, to document how, since its inception in 1998, CalGang has grown both in the number of individuals under surveillance and the number of what we call adjacent users, which we define as people who can access CalGang data but were not initially intended as users and who, in pre-digital surveillance eras, would have a much more difficult time obtaining the information. In this paper we focus specifically on adjacent users in the immigration system who determine the detention and deportation of noncitizens by leveraging an information sharing agreement that gave U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to Calgang between January 2006 and October 2016. Using a two-way “difference in differences” approach, we estimate the impact of CalGang interoperability on federal adjacent users by comparing outcomes across immigration cases that began before or after the data sharing agreement ended. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses both demonstrate that immigration adjudicators’ access to local electronic surveillance information is associated with an increase in the number of immigrants facing criminal immigration charges that do not necessarily require a formal criminal conviction in state court, and that deportation rates are higher when ICE has access to local electronic surveillance.

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Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy

Cited by 36 publications

References 0 publications

Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical Capability

Leveling the Odds: The Effect of Quality Legal Representation in Cases of Asymmetrical Capability

Introduction

Electronic Surveillance in Immigration Court: Evidence from the CalGang Database

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