Immigration Policy Under the Howard Government

Abstract

Up until 1989 Australian immigration policy was based on Ministerial discretion. This gave the executive the power to decide policy without review either by parliament or the courts. But during the 1980s the context changed. Many more would‐be immigrants were already on Australian soil on a temporary basis and, if they were rejected, they could appeal to the courts. Ministerial discretion was hard to defend in court and selection criteria were progressively widened by court judgments. The Hawke Government compounded these difficulties by a number of unwise policy decisions. By 1996 the immigration program that the Howard Government inherited lacked a clear economic rationale, was dominated by family reunion, brought in many migrants who needed welfare support and was open to fraud. It was also unpopular. The Howard/Ruddock reforms sharpened the program's economic focus, reduced the size of the family‐reunion component, restricted new migrants' access to welfare and increased the program's integrity. The new Government also took a firm stance on border control and tried to limit the role of the courts. Many of these reforms have been controversial but, by 2002, immigration was much less unpopular than it had been in 1996.

Skill, Migration and Gender in Australia and Canada: The Case of Gender-based Analysis

“…The overwhelming majority of academic and practical analysis of skilled immigration focuses on economic considerations. This includes the unemployment levels of skilled migrants compared with family reunion migrants and the long-term sustainability of skilled immigration (see, for instance, Betts 2003;Cobb-Clark 2000). Less attention has been paid to the implications of skilled immigration schemes for women.…”

“…The high economic performance of skilled migrants may also be a product of exogenous factors, such as Australia's improved economic status since 1996 (Richardson et al 2004, 8) or less discrimination within the labour market towards skilled migrants owing to their greater English-speaking abilities (Ho and Alcorso, 2004). Despite the complexities of the debate, the popular sentiment that skilled migrants are more financially self-reliant than family reunion migrants has remained, and has provided significant political support for the skilled immigration programs in place in Australia and Canada (Betts 2003;CIC 2004a, 7).…”

The two solitudes of Canadian nativism: Explaining the absence of a competitive anti‐immigration party in Canada

“…Nativist posturing around the issue by Howard in the late 1990s and early 2000s served to “soak up” much of One Nation's support, and Howard made greater use of the issue while in power to shore up support than did Stephen Harper (Snow & Moffitt, 2012). The Howard government severely restricted the family reunion programme and cut access to welfare payments for new immigrants (Betts, 2003). Howard also made controversial changes to the humanitarian programme, driven by the Tampa affair , strengthening state capacity to prevent boats carrying asylum‐seekers from reaching Australia's sovereign territory.…”

The Labour Market Integration of Immigrants in Australia

“…The selection criteria were not specified and the government could thus easily change them, which, as a result, happened rather frequently. The large scope for discretion led to a situation in which many denied onshore applications were successfully challenged by appeal or in court (Betts 2003). That situation changed with the 1989 Immigration Amendment Act, which established clearer rules and selection criteria.…”