Immigration, threat perception, and national identity: Evidence from South Korea

Changing “us” and hostility towards “them”—Implicit theories of national identity determine prejudice and participation rates in an anti‐immigrant petition

“…It was shown that people who exclude immigrants with a narrow definition of the national “us” (e.g., Germans defined by contents like ethnicity or inherited culture) exhibit more hostility toward immigrants than individuals who define national identity more inclusively (e.g., Germans defined by contents such as shared values). This relation has been shown in both cross‐sectional as well as longitudinal studies including diverse populations from over 30 countries and all four populated continents (e.g., Billiet, Maddens, & Beerten, ; Ha & Jang, ; Jones, , ; Maddens, Billiet, & Beerten, ; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, ; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, ; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, ).…”

Different Immigrants, Same Attitudes? Making Sense of the Association Between Two Immigrant Groups

“…In Japan, for example, public negative sentiments toward immigration are induced by the perception of threats to ethnic homogeneity (Chung, ; Green, ; Strausz, ). In South Korea, by the same token, citizens who are concerned with cultural unity are more likely to favor a restrictive immigration policy (Ha and Jang, ). Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is also an ethnoculturally homogeneous country and, thus, examining public attitudes toward immigrants in Taiwan can further contribute to our understanding of immigration attitudes in general.…”

Opium of the people? National identification predicts well‐being over time

“…It is important to highlight that the above studies predominately operationalized national attachment in terms of its affective (e.g., pride and satisfaction) and ideological dimensions (e.g., patriotism) as opposed to its cognitive dimension (i.e., identification); only Ha and Jang's (2015) research included a measure of national identification, and it was found to be unrelated to happiness (their main measure of 'well-being'). These operationalizations are in line with the literature, which conceptualizes the cognitive, ideological, and affective dimensions of national attachment as distinct yet interrelated dimensions differentially associated with political beliefs and attitudes, prejudice, and happiness (e.g., Blank & Schmidt, 2003;Ha & Jang, 2015;Huddy & Khatib, 2007;Mummendey et al, 2001;Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). For example, feeling American is not contingent on support for a particular political ideology (Huddy & Khatib, 2007), and conservatives (versus liberals) tend to report higher levels of subjective well-being (e.g., Napier & Jost, 2008;Schlenker, Chambers, & Le, 2012).…”

“…However, there exists a marginal body of research evidencing an association between different operationalizations of national attachment and well-being. For example, Ha and Jang (2015) found that national pride but not national identity was associated with happiness in a nationally representative sample from South Korea, whereas Zdrenka, Yogeeswaran, Stronge, and Sibley (2015) observed a positive relationship between patriotism and quality of life in a nationally representative sample from New Zealand. These two studies were preceded by two interrelated multi-nation correlational studies demonstrating that satisfaction with one's nation predicted satisfaction with life in 128 countries (Morrison, Tay, & Diener, 2011), and that national pride and nationalism predicted subjective well-being in 31 countries (Reeskens & Wright, 2011).…”