Immigration Wage Effects by Origin

Abstract

We estimate the direct partial wage effects of immigrant-induced increases in labor supply, using the national skill cell approach with longitudinal records drawn from Norwegian administrative registers. The results show overall negative but heterogeneous wage effects, with larger effects on immigrant wages than on native wages and with native wages more responsive to inflows from Nordic countries than from developing countries. These patterns are consistent with natives and Nordic citizens being close substitutes, while natives and immigrants from developing countries are imperfect substitutes. Estimates are sensitive to accounting for effective immigrant experience, selective native participation, and variation in demand conditions and native labor supply.

The Effect of Emigration from Poland on Polish Wages

“…As noted by Bratsberg et al . () and Bratsberg and Raaum (), it might be difficult to compare our estimated coefficient in equation with those obtained from studies in other countries because different studies report different coefficients, and because of cross‐country differences in the size of the emigrant (or immigrant) population. Here, we follow Bratsberg et al .…”

“…Here, we follow Bratsberg et al . () and compute the elasticity of non‐emigrant wages with respect to the size of the emigrant labour force. An advantage of this measure is that it is unaffected by systematic undercounting, which could lead to an overestimate of the effects of emigration, as long as undercounting is proportional to the true number (see Section ).…”

How do rigid labor markets absorb immigration? Evidence from France

“…This measure is used in various studies-see, e.g., Aydemir and Borjas (2007), Borjas et al (2010), Cortes (2008), and Bratsberg et al (2014). In France, the share of male immigrants in the workforce increased from 7 % in 1990 to 8.5 % in 2002.…”

“…As explained in Borjas (2003) and Bratsberg et al (2014), the evolution of the immigrant share over time may be driven by changes in the native labor supply (as the number of natives in the workforce is at the denominator of the immigrant share). Specifications B2 and C2 thus control for this possibility and include the log of the number of natives in the workforce as additional regressor.…”

Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration

“…Llavador and SolanoGarcía (2011) present a political economic model in which labor-market concerns together with non-economic factors, e.g., cultural and security concerns, shape native attitudes toward immigrants. 9 Our paper expands this literature by looking at the integrated predictions of both the size of the welfare state and the size of the immigration quota. Even though in our theoretical model we do not consider non-economic factors, this dimension can easily be incorporated.…”