Immobility and the Brexit vote

Abstract

Popular explanations of the Brexit vote have centred on the division between cosmopolitan internationalists who voted Remain, and geographically rooted individuals who voted Leave.In this paper, we conduct the first empirical test of whether residential immobility -the concept underpinning this distinction -was an important variable in the Brexit vote. We find that locally rooted individuals -defined as those living in their county of birth -were 7 percent more likely to vote Leave. However, the impact of immobility was filtered by local circumstances: immobility only mattered for respondents in areas experiencing relative economic decline or increases in migrant populations.

In what sense left behind by globalisation? Looking for a less reductionist geography of the populist surge in Europe

“…In addition to this occupationally-related basis for localist/cosmopolitan orientations (and the related mover/stayer divide highlighted by Lee et al (2017), membership of some kinds of trans-local civil society organisations may also serve to attenuate a disposition to pure/defensive localism. Specifically we might expect this to be the case for those religious groups and industrial unions cultivating strong senses of identity cutting across those of place, nationality or ethnicity.…”

“…Beyond this, there is the usual ambiguity as to whether such a pattern is read as reflecting the spatial distribution of different types of people whose propensities are unaffected by location, or the effects (on all or most) of exogenous spatial factors, such as accessibility, industrial histories or political inattention in this case. Statistical analyses of the UK referendum have started to look at the relative importance of these, but scarcely so far at how individual and situational factors might interact to shape different patterns of political response in different places (perhaps only in Goodwin and Heath's, 2016b, exploration of British Election Survey data, and now in Lee et al, 2017). This paper tries to address two challenges in making sense of the evidence of spatial unevenness of populist movements within European countries.…”

Leavers and Remainers after the Brexit referendum: More united than divided after all?

“…This research has mainly focused on the predictors of people’s voting decision. The findings revealed that the decision to vote ‘leave’ is associated with higher concerns about immigration and multiculturalism, British collective narcissism, Islamophobia, political conservatism, authoritarianism, distrust in the government, stronger British identity, social change insecurities, conspiracy beliefs, negative contact with EU immigrants, lower tolerance towards ambiguity, cognitive flexibility, agreeableness and openness personality traits, education, income, and increased age (Abrams & Travaglino, ; Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, ; Garretsen, Stoker, Soudis, Martin, & Rentfrow, ; Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, ; Harper & Hogue, ; Hobolt, ; Lee, Morris, & Kemeny, ; Matti & Zhou, ; Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, ; Swami, Barron, Weis, & Furnham, ; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, ). In short, these findings suggest that Leavers are more likely to express negative views of immigrants, to be higher in conservatism and distrust in politicians, and to be older and less educated.…”

5. Explaining the Brexit Vote: A Socioeconomic and Psychological Exploration of the Referendum Vote

“…Populist movements have capitalised on the predicament of the left behind, arguing that the cosmopolitan elite disregard the lower, 'left-behind' classes, allowing low-skilled immigration to increase competition for jobs and failing to help communities to recover from the effects of recession (Lee et al, 2018). Understandably, then, the "left-behind" in Britain tend to feel that they have little power over events in their lives.…”