Impact of Asymmetric Carbon Information on Supply Chain Decisions under Low-Carbon Policies

Abstract

Through the establishment of the leading manufacturer Stackelberg game model under asymmetric carbon information, this paper investigates the misreporting behaviors of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance. Based on “Benchmarking” allocation mechanism, three policies are considered: carbon emission trading, carbon tax, and a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism. The results show that, in the three models, the leader in the supply chain, even if he has advantages of carbon information, will not lie about his information. That is because the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior has no effect on supply chain members’ performance. But the retailer will lie about the information when he has carbon information advantage. The high-carbon-emission retailers under the carbon trading policy, all the retailers under the carbon tax policy, and the high-carbon-emission retailers under combined quotas and tax policy would like to understate their carbon emissions. Coordination of revenue sharing contract is studied in supply chain to induce the retailer to declare his real carbon information. Optimal contractual parameters are deduced in the three models, under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized.

Cooperation Modes of Operations and Financing in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain

“…Du et al [40] found that the cap-and-trade scheme would constrain the total carbon emissions and promote low-carbon production simultaneously under certain conditions. Yang et al [41] put forward a new policy which combined carbon quota and carbon tax mechanism and study the misreporting behaviors under three different polices.…”

Optimal Decisions for Carbon Emission Reduction through Technological Innovation in a Hybrid-Channel Supply Chain with Consumers’ Channel Preferences

“…It can be found from (8) that the retailer's price increases with the manufacturer's wholesale price and the carbon emission level , since * / = 1/2 > 0 and * / = /2( + ) > 0. Although increasing the wholesale price will inevitably push up the retailer's price and reduce the demand in return, it can be compensated for by increasing the carbon emission reduction level.…”

“…Interestingly, the retail price increases with , while it decreases with , , and . Based on the retailer's response function (8), we obtain the manufacturer's optimal decisions in Proposition 3. Corollary 4 indicates that the higher carbon price can stimulate the manufacturer to emit less carbon only when a certain condition, that is, > 0 is satisfied.…”

“…As effective choices to curb carbon emissions and mitigate greenhouse effects, carbon cap-and-trade [5,6], carbon tax [7,8], and carbon labelling [9] have all been adopted by both governments and firms. In particular, the cap-and-trade regulation has proven to be an effective way to achieve emission reduction goals [10].…”

“…For a traditional supply chain, if the retailer makes their price decisions according to(8), then the manufacturer's optimal decisions can be determined as follows:(i) if [ − ( + ) ] 2 ≤ 4 ( + )( − ), then the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price and carbon emission reduction level are Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 7 * = 2 ( + ) [1 + ( − + 0 )] ( − ) − [( + ) (1 − ) − ( + 0 )] [(ii) if [ − ( + ) ] 2 > 4 ( + )( − ), then the manufacturer's optimal carbon emission reduction level is * = { and the optimal wholesale price is * = 2 ( + ) [1 + ( − + 0 )] − [( + ) − ] * ] two different methods for the manufacturer to determine the wholesale price and carbon emission reduction level, which depends on whether the Hessian matrix of profit function (3) is negative definite or not. Specifically, the condition [ − ( + ) ] 2 ≤ 4 ( + )( − ) ensures that the manufacturer's profit function (3) is jointly concave with ( , ).…”