1996
DOI: 10.2307/256787
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Impact of Corporate Insider, Blockholder, and Institutional Equity Ownership on Firm Risk Taking.

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Cited by 404 publications
(253 citation statements)
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“…2 Next, shareholders have significant impact on firms' financial decisions by holding sizable stakes in companies. They can shape the nature of a firm's corporate risk taking, which may affect its ability to compete, and eventually its survival (Wright et al (1996)). An excessive appetite for risk can result in high-variance asset composition, which may cause negative repercussions in the whole economy.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Next, shareholders have significant impact on firms' financial decisions by holding sizable stakes in companies. They can shape the nature of a firm's corporate risk taking, which may affect its ability to compete, and eventually its survival (Wright et al (1996)). An excessive appetite for risk can result in high-variance asset composition, which may cause negative repercussions in the whole economy.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A firm's risk-taking refers to the amount of uncertainty associated with the expected outcomes and cash flows as a result of investments in new projects Wright, Ferrris & Awasthi 1996). It can provide some idea about the firm's growth, performance, and survival (Bromiley 1991;Lee, Kim & Kim 2016).…”
Section: Theoretical Basismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…É uma teoria contratualista da organização que procura explicar o comportamento dos gestores e a forma como a assimetria de informação 3 influencia o equilíbrio de poderes no seio de uma organização, abrindo margem a idiossincrasias que tanto prejudicam as boas práticas administrativas (Sato, 2007). Observa-se, pela ilustração na figura 1, que o bem-estar do principal não pode ser maximizado porque o principal e o agente possuem diferentes objetivos e diferentes predisposições ao risco (Wright et al, 1996).…”
Section: O Problema Principal-agente Nas Escolhas Públicasunclassified