Impact of government subsidy on the optimal strategies of improving water use efficiency for a high-water-consumption manufacturer

Abstract

PurposeIn order to encourage the high-water-consumption (HWC) manufacturers to carry out water-saving transformation relying on self-strength or outsourcing to a water-saving service company (WSSC) during production processes, government subsidies are provided according to water-saving efforts (WSE) or investment cost. In this context, the authors derive the participant's equilibrium decisions and the manufacturer's water-saving strategy. Additionally, the effects of subsidies on WSE and stakeholders' profits are discussed.Design/methodology/approachMathematical models including optimization model and Stackelberg game model are constructed under different subsidy schemes.FindingsThe study finds that (1) there exists a threshold related to the subsidy coefficient for the HWC manufacturer when choosing between self-saving and outsourcing-saving. (2) When the technological competitive advantage between WSSC and manufacturer is within a certain range, government's subsidy promotes HWC enterprises to choose outsourcing-saving. (3) Given a water-saving mode, subsidy on investment cost is more effective for the government to achieve more environmental performance.Research limitations/implicationsFirst, subsidy endogeneity can be considered to explore the optimal interval for government subsidies to maximize social welfare. Second, in outsourcing-saving, other types of contract can be discussed. Another extension is about model uncertainties. Finally, other policies on improving water efficiency can be also examined.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implication for HWC manufacturers to select the best water-saving mode under subsidy, and it allows policymakers to understand the efficiency of proposed subsidies.Originality/valueDecisions on water-saving efforts, selection of water-saving modes and operational planning are also regarded as business strategies in the paper. Particularly, the influences of different government subsidies are also considered and compared.

Can the water resources tax policy effectively stimulate the water saving behavior of social water users? A DSGE model embedded in water resources tax

“…On the other hand, enterprises should be encouraged to develop water-saving technologies, adopt water-saving equipment for production, improve production processes and promote upgrading industrial structures [60]. Through the investment of special tax funds, the production cost of enterprises decreases, the profit returns to the average level, the wage level gradually recovers, the consumption activities increase, and the economic development returns to stability [61]. Overall, the water resources tax reduces industrial water demand and improves water efficiency.…”