Impact of Information Asymmetry on the Operation of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Government Regulation

Abstract

Recycling subsidy and carbon tax policies are ways to achieve energy and environmental sustainability. The implementation of these policies has changed the operating environment of traditional closed-loop supply chains, while the privacy of relevant information increases the difficulty of decision-making. Under the background, this paper considers the green closed-loop supply chain (GCLSC) under the hybrid policy of recycling subsidy and carbon tax where the manufacturer is in charge of recycling and the retailer invests in green marketing. Taking green marketing cost coefficient as the retailer’s private information, this paper explores the influence of information asymmetry on optimal decisions and performance of the GCLSC. By constructing game models of information symmetry and asymmetry, the optimal decisions, economic and environmental performance, and social welfare are provided. Combined with numerical analysis, the influence of uncertainty of the manufacturer’s estimation, subsidies and carbon tax on the GCLSC is proposed. The results indicate that the uncertainty in the manufacturer’s estimation can improve the social welfare under certain conditions, but it cannot reduce carbon emissions. Recycling subsidy and carbon tax policies oppositely affect the manufacturer’s optimal decisions and carbon emissions. Information asymmetry is beneficial to the retailer. However, less uncertainty in estimation is not always better for the manufacturer. The manufacturer needs to proactively adopt strategies to stimulate the retailer’s information sharing.

Optimal Contract Design in Contract Farming under Asymmetric Effort Information

“…In addition to the shortage of funds, supply chain enterprises are also facing problems caused by information asymmetry [13,14]. Despite BDF solving the financial dilemma of farmers, the original information asymmetry in contract agriculture greatly affects the income of farmers and upstream enterprises, which is mainly reflected in the moral hazard caused by the unobservable efforts of farmers.…”