Impact of Market Forces on Addictive Substances and Behaviours

Abstract

This book examines the ‘web of influence’ formed by industries which manufacture and sell ‘addictive’ products in the EU. The differences between alcohol, food, gambling, and tobacco as consumer products are obvious. However, we explore whether food, alcohol, and gambling industries are merely replicating tobacco tactics or innovating in corporate strategy. Using a new data set on corporate networks formed by the tobacco, alcohol, food, and gambling industries at the EU level, the book shows the interlocking connections between corporations, trade associations, and policy intermediaries, including lobbyists and think tanks. Quantitative data guide qualitative studies on the content of corporate strategy and the attempts of corporations to ‘capture’ policy and three crucial ancillary domains—science, civil society, and the news and promotional media. The effects of these three arenas on policy networks and outcomes are examined with a focus on new forms of policy partnership such as corporate social responsibility and partnership governance. Drawing on our structural data, we show the comprehensive engagement of industry with science-policy issues in the EU, the ways that corporations can dominate agendas and decision making, as well as the potential for popular pressures and public health agendas to be effective. The book concludes by asking what solutions might be possible to the evident public health challenges posed by the addictions web of influence. It proposes key evidence-based transparency and public health reforms that have the best chance of minimizing the burden of disease from addictions in the medium to long term.

Sponsorship of paediatric associations by manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes

“…As Mead Johnson's former Chief Executive has said: "We have to wait for babies to be born that we can capture". 13 Commercial pressure on governments from industry has been described as a "web of influence", 14 working via interlocking connections between corporations, trade associations, policy bodies, and think tanks. These connections can also include health professionals.…”

Reframing the science and policy of nicotine, illegal drugs and alcohol – conclusions of the ALICE RAP Project

“…Thirdly, corporate power 17 , through multiple channels of influence, can hinder evidence-based policy decisions 5 . Corporate strategies often include attempts to influence civil society, science and the media, as part of a wider aim to manage and, if possible, capture institutions that set policy.…”

“…There are international models encouraging better control of commercial communications in the public health interest, the most notable being the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 83 . In addition to commercial communications, the private sector drives harm through shaping drug policies, leading to more drug-related deaths 5 . Governance structures thus need to have the capability and expertise to supervise industry movements that shape drug-related legislation and regulations, including regulating and restricting political lobbying.…”

A New Development in Front Group Strategy: The Social Aspects Public Relations Organization (SAPRO)

“…Despite claims that they operate in the public interest and remain independent of their funders, alcohol SAPROs have been found to advocate for their funding industries (Carah and van Horen, 2011;Pietracatella and Brady, 2016;Miller et al, 2018). The type of pro-consumption lobbying in which SAPROs invest has also been found to block actual harm reduction (Miller et al, 2018).…”

“…Despite claims that they operate in the public interest and remain independent of their funders, alcohol SAPROs have been found to advocate for their funding industries (Carah and van Horen, 2011;Pietracatella and Brady, 2016;Miller et al, 2018). The type of pro-consumption lobbying in which SAPROs invest has also been found to block actual harm reduction (Miller et al, 2018). The risk industries behind SAPROs deny that SAPROs are PR organizations and claim that SAPROs perform CSR activities for their industries and that the resulting reputational benefits should grant them a seat at the policy table (Miller et al, 2011;Avery et al, 2016).…”