Impact of Parent Companies and Multiple Large Shareholders on Audit Fees in Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

Abstract

This study aimed to investigate the impact of parent companies and other multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on the audit fees in Japanese firms, where stakeholder-oriented corporate governance is adopted. In such a firm, monitoring by many stakeholders can mitigate conflicts among shareholders. However, because the key stakeholders of these firms tend to resolve information asymmetry problems through insider communication, the level of audit effort is affected not only by the audit risk from principal–principal conflicts, but also by the demands of key stakeholders. Japanese parent companies tend to spin off their departments with high growth potential and provide incentives to lower subsidiaries’ cost of capital through information disclosure. Therefore, parent companies require greater audit efforts, and consequently, audit fees are expected to be higher. However, when MLSs are shareholders of the listed subsidiary, they can obtain relevant information via private communication. Thus, the need for quality accounting information will be smaller, the level of audit effort required will be smaller, and as a result, audit fees will be smaller. The results are consistent with these expectations. This paper contributes to the sustainable growth and economic development of firms and markets and has implications for the development of effective corporate governance mechanisms.

Sahiplik Yapısının Denetim Ücreti Üzerindeki Etkisi: Borsa İstanbul'da Bir Uygulama

“…Örneklem seçimiyle ilgili ayrıntılar Tablo 1'de gösterilmektedir. (Abbott vd., 2003;Alhababsah, 2019;Alkebsee vd., 2021;Carcello vd., 2002;Mitra vd., 2007;Nelson ve Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015;Niemi, 2005;Shan vd., 2019) En büyük sahiplik (BUY_S) Şirketteki en büyük ortağın sahiplik oranı (Ben Ali vd., 2020;Kao vd., 2019;Yamada ve Fujita, 2022) Kurumsal sahiplik (KUR_S) Şirketteki kurumsal sahiplik oranı (Alhababsah, 2019;Ben Ali ve Lesage, 2013;Kao vd., 2019;Pronobis ve Schaeuble, 2022;Simunic, 1980) Yabancı sahiplik (YAB_S) Şirketteki yabancı sahiplik oranı (Alhababsah, 2019;Kao vd., 2019;Nelson ve Mohamed-Rusdi, 2015;Niemi, 2005;Pronobis ve Schaeuble, 2022) Dağınık sahiplik (DAG_S) Şirketin halka açıklık oranı (Bayrakdaroğlu, 2010;Desender vd, 2013;Quick vd., 2013) Şirketin Yaşı (YAS) Şirketin yaşının doğal logaritması (Kao vd., 2019) Büyüklük (BYKLK) Aktif toplamının doğal logaritması (Alhababsah, 2019;Harymawan vd., 2023) Dört Büyük Denetim Kuruluşu (BDK) Şirket, dört büyük denetim kuruluşu tarafından denetlenmişse 1, yoksa 0 (Ben Ali vd., 2020;Choi vd., 2008;Harymawan vd., 2023;Pronobis ve Schaeuble, 2022) Karlılık oranı (KAR_O)…”

“…Yamada ve Fujita (2022), Tokyo Menkul Kıymetler Borsası'na kayıtlı şirketlerin 2010-2019 yıllarına ait verileri kullanarak en büyük hissedarın payının denetim ücreti üzerindeki etkisini incelemişlerdir. Buna göre sahiplik yoğunlaşması ile denetim ücreti arasında negatif bir ilişki bulunmuştur.Ulusal literatürde sahiplik yapısı genellikle finansal performans, sermaye yapısı, kar kalitesi ve kar düzleştirme ile birlikte incelenmiştir.…”

“…Literatürdeki çalışmalar (Ben Ali vd., 2020: 31;Yamada ve Fujita, 2022:1) hissedar büyüklüğü ile denetim ücreti arasında negatif ilişki bulmuştur. Bu düşüncenin ardından aşağıdaki hipotez geliştirilmiştir.…”

Examining the Role of Government Intervention in Market Failure and Government Failure

“…Moreover, analyzing the relationship between the future cash flow forecast information provided by financial analysts and accounting information, Oh and Shin (2019) showed the results that information asymmetry between manager and investor could be reduced based on the rich information environment, and the analysts' cash flow forecasting information was expected to reduce the information asymmetry between the company and the investor, thereby increasing the transparency and sustainability of the firm. Yamada and Fujita (2022) investigated the impact of parent companies and other multiple large shareholders (MLSs) on the audit fees in Japanese firms, and highlighted that the level of audit effort was affected not only by audit risk from principal-principal conflicts, but also by the demands of key stakeholders because the key stakeholders of these firms tended to resolve information asymmetry problems through insider communication.…”