2006
DOI: 10.1177/1077558705284057
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Impact of Pay-for-Performance Contracts and Network Registry on Diabetes and Asthma HEDIS® Measures in an Integrated Delivery Network

Abstract: This article reviews the experience of a large, heterogeneous integrated delivery network that incorporated physician quality metrics into pay-for-performance contracts. The authors present criteria for including measures in pay-for-performance contracts and offer a practical approach to determining withhold return or bonus distribution based on improvement and performance. They demonstrate interventions undertaken to improve performance, including the development of a claims-based registry. Empirical data sho… Show more

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Cited by 61 publications
(63 citation statements)
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“…These studies often suffer from poor study design: some of them only employed simple before-after mean comparison or trend comparison (Levin-Scherz et al 2006;Young et al 2007;Cutler et al 2007;Pearson et al 2008); others do not provide any comparison group as the counterfactuals (Amundson et al 2003;Mandel and Kotagal 2007;Chung et al 2010;Boland et al 2010;Lester et al 2010;Coleman et al 2007). Some of the programs were targeted at health plans or clinics instead of individual physicians, so the lack of individuallevel data makes it difficult to draw inference on physician responses to P4P incentives (FeltLisk et al 2007;Gavagan et al 2010).…”
Section: Empirical Evidence On Physician Response To P4pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These studies often suffer from poor study design: some of them only employed simple before-after mean comparison or trend comparison (Levin-Scherz et al 2006;Young et al 2007;Cutler et al 2007;Pearson et al 2008); others do not provide any comparison group as the counterfactuals (Amundson et al 2003;Mandel and Kotagal 2007;Chung et al 2010;Boland et al 2010;Lester et al 2010;Coleman et al 2007). Some of the programs were targeted at health plans or clinics instead of individual physicians, so the lack of individuallevel data makes it difficult to draw inference on physician responses to P4P incentives (FeltLisk et al 2007;Gavagan et al 2010).…”
Section: Empirical Evidence On Physician Response To P4pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[1][2][3][4][5][6] The care of patients with multiple clinical conditions has to balance the clinical benefits of achieving disease-based quality standards with addressing competing patient priorities that reflect their clinical illnesses. [7][8][9] Methods to measure quality of care in patients with multiple clinical conditions have been poorly developed because of the "one size fits all" principle underlying current quality measurement approaches.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 In a large, heterogenous integrated delivery network, P4P contracts for physicians led to significant improvement in quality metrics relating to care of asthmatic and diabetic patients. 16 A program involving 45 000 physicians in California estimated that, in the first full year of P4P, 210 000 more patients received cervical and breast cancer screening, immunisations or diabetes tests. 17 While the debate around efficacy continues, several commentators have raised concerns about unintended, adverse consequences of P4P and whether such a strategy can achieve sustained across-the-board improvements in care.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%