2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2020.02.007
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Impact of payment model on the behaviour of specialist physicians: A systematic review

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Cited by 27 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…It has been already noticed in a literature that compared to FFS, introduction of capitation model results in less patient visits, lesser continuity of care, but patients are more satisfied with access to a doctor [42]. Replacing FFS payments with capitation models most often leads to a smaller number of medical services, not only in the area of primary care but also in area of ambulatory care, and to fewer elective surgeries (e.g., cataracts and tubal ligation) [43]. FFS is typically associated with more primary care visits/contacts (about 5-7% more compared to capitation), as well as more specialist visits and more diagnostic and therapeutic services.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It has been already noticed in a literature that compared to FFS, introduction of capitation model results in less patient visits, lesser continuity of care, but patients are more satisfied with access to a doctor [42]. Replacing FFS payments with capitation models most often leads to a smaller number of medical services, not only in the area of primary care but also in area of ambulatory care, and to fewer elective surgeries (e.g., cataracts and tubal ligation) [43]. FFS is typically associated with more primary care visits/contacts (about 5-7% more compared to capitation), as well as more specialist visits and more diagnostic and therapeutic services.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…23 With perverse incentives potentially leading to service distortion, policy-makers attempt to balance incentives by mixing different types of payments, 7,24 or by creating risk-adjusted payments such as capitations or diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). 22 While the debate over how economic incentives are translated into healthcare providers' actions is not new, [25][26][27][28] it is important to note that providers are motivated by other considerations apart from financial ones, such as professional norms and status. 7 Professional norms include, inter alia, quality of care and the regard for the patient.…”
Section: Physician Agency and Dilemmas Between Economic And Clinical Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is proved that the payment methods preferred by patients, namely the collaboration of the physician with the health insurance fund, and, in this case, some expenses are covered for the insured patients, radically influence the relationship with patients. These models influence the perception upon the quality of medical services and improve the patients' trust [38]. The relationship of the employer and the private clinic with the medical staff regarding their payment method was also analyzed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%