Impact of strategy-neutral rewarding on the evolution of cooperative behavior

Liu, Jinzhuo; Li, Tong; Wang, Wei; Zhao, Na; Hang, Feilu

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.11.001

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Therefore, it is not surprising that those who contribute first gain less than the defector players who just enjoy the fruit of others' efforts. This annoying conclusion cannot be avoided, just only if we assume some additional circumstance, like punishing defectors, rewarding cooperators [24,25,26,27,28,29], or other more sophisticated mechanism which allows cooperators to collect competitive payoff [30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tactical cooperation of defectors in a multi-stage public goods game

Szolnoki

Chen

2022

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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The basic social dilemma is frequently captured by a public goods game where participants decide simultaneously whether to support a common pool or not and after the enhanced contributions are distributed uniformly among all competitors. What if the result of common efforts is not distributed immediately, but it is reinvested and added to the pool for a next round? This extension may not only result in an enhanced benefit for group members but also opens new strategies for involved players because they may act in distinct rounds differently. In this work we focus on the simplest case when two rounds are considered, but the applied multiplication factors dedicated to a certain round can be different. We show that in structured populations the winning strategy may depend sensitively on the ratio of these factors and the last round has a special importance to reach a fully cooperative state. We also observe that it may pay for defectors to support the first round and after enjoy the extra benefit of accumulated contributions. Full cooperator strategy is only viable if the second round ensures a premium benefit of investments.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tactical cooperation of defectors in a multi-stage public goods game

Szolnoki

Chen

2022

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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“…For a higher individual benefit it is tempting to betray our partner, therefore to aid cooperators or to lower the income of defectors could be a solution to resolve the mentioned social dilemmas [11,12,13]. The latter can be done via a punishment where the personal income of those who do not want to contribute to the common pool may be reduced [14,15,16,17,18,19]. For completeness, we note that there are alternative ways of punishment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mercenary punishment in structured populations

Lee¹,

Colin²,

Szolnoki³

2021

Preprint

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Punishing those who refuse to participate in common efforts is a known and intensively studied way to maintain cooperation among self-interested agents. But this act is costly, hence punishers who are generally also engaged in the original joint venture, become vulnerable, which jeopardizes the effectiveness of this incentive. As an alternative, we may hire special players, whose only duty is to watch the population and punish defectors. Such a policelike or mercenary punishment can be maintained by a tax-based fund. If this tax is negligible, a cyclic dominance may emerge among different strategies. When this tax is relevant then this solution disappears. In the latter case, the fine level becomes a significant factor that determines whether punisher players coexist with cooperators or alternatively with defectors. The maximal average outcome can be reached at an intermediate cost value of punishment. Our observations highlight that we should take special care when such kind of punishment and accompanying tax are introduced to reach a collective goal.

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“…In particular, the public goods game has been recognized as a paradigm, which succinctly describes the essential dilemma of cooperation [2,6]. Recent works on the public goods game have proposed effective means to enable the evolution of cooperation, such as punishment [7][8][9][10][11][12][13], reward [14][15][16], exclusion [17][18][19][20], and individual migration [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

2020

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Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector, while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework of spatially social games. such mode of migration leads to the outbreak of cooperation. On the other hand, Chen et al proposed riskdriven migration in the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square lattice and found that risk-driven migration dramatically enhances the evolution of public cooperation when individuals move away from unfavorable locations [41].It is worth pointing out that most of previous works consider random migration [28,40], success-driven migration [27], or risk-driven migration [41] separately. They do not consider the orientation-driven migration under which different migration preferences or migration modes are considered in a unified framework. Indeed individuals can adjust their moving orientation according to these preferred modes. By means of migration they can move away from unfavorable environment, pursuit the profitable circumstances, or choose other directions as they wish in realistic situations. However, it is still unclear how such orientation-driven migration influences the evolution of cooperation and which mode of individual migration can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively.In this work, we thereby propose an orientation-driven migration into a population of mobile individuals playing the public goods game. We assume that individuals can choose the direction of mobility depending on the strategy types of their neighbors on a two-dimensional plane under such orientation-driven migration. Correspondingly, individuals can choose to escape from neighboring defectors or move to neighboring cooperato...

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Impact of strategy-neutral rewarding on the evolution of cooperative behavior

Cited by 10 publications

References 39 publications

Tactical cooperation of defectors in a multi-stage public goods game

Tactical cooperation of defectors in a multi-stage public goods game

Mercenary punishment in structured populations

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

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