Impact of Swift and Certain Sanctions

Abstract

W a s h i n g t o n S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Christopher M. Campbell P o r t l a n d S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Jacqueline van Wormer W a s h i n g t o n S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Alex Kigerl W a s h i n g t o n S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Brianne Posey W a s h i n g t o n S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Research SummaryIn the wake of the mass incarceration movement, many states must now manage the rebound of decarceration. Thermodynamic forces of the justice system, however, have pushed former fiscal pressures of institutions onto that of community corrections. Encouraged by the positive findings of recently piloted innovations, several jurisdictions have taken great interest in the implementation of deterrence-based sanctioning models when dealing with supervision violations. Among the first to implement a statewide turn to this style of sanctioning, Washington State's swift-and-certain (SAC) policy was implemented in June 2012. The intent of SAC was to expand the model found in Hawaii's Opportunity Probation and Enforcement (HOPE) to a wider criminal justiceEvaluating Offenders On Community Supervision population, while emphasizing the reduction of confinement costs. This study focused on the impact of SAC with regard to supervision outcomes for participants. By using a quasi-experimental design, we examined confinement, recidivism, treatment, violation, and costs outcomes of SAC participants. Findings reveal that SAC participants were found to incur fewer sanctioned incarceration days after a violation, reduced odds of recidivism, possessed greater treatment program utilization, reduced their propensity of committing violations over time, and as a result, imposed lower correctional and associated costs. The SAC model provides noteworthy positive effects and no appreciable negative impacts on public safety. Policy ImplicationsWe further discuss the impact of SAC in the context of deterrence-based sanctioning. Specifically, we explain how practices such as SAC may impact the future of sanctioning community supervision conditions. Although many policies that emphasize deterrence demonstrate inconsistent findings, immediate advantages of SAC take the form of fiscal savings, indicating that these novel methods provide a form of justice reinvestment. Additionally, connecting deterrence-based supervision methods to reductions in most recidivism measures suggests that proportionality and quality assurance may increase the effectiveness of these policies. We recommend ways that such nuanced implementation may be fruitful, as well as suggest ways of conceptualizing the theory of deterrence. Policy makers can appropriately work its components into supervision practice without depreciating the importance of treatment and addressing criminogenic needs.

A Preliminary Evaluation of the Supervision With Immediate Enforcement Probation Program for Adult Gang–Affiliated Offenders in Texas

“…In multivariate analyses, SWIFT gang offenders performed similarly to those in the probation comparison groups in their odds of receiving a new arrest/charge while on supervision (i.e., in-program recidivism). This lack of intervention effect on in-program recidivism is inconsistent with Hawken and Kleiman’s (2009) evaluation of HOPE and more consistent with recent evaluations of HOPE (e.g., Cook, 2016; Hamilton et al, 2016; Kleiman, 2016). In short, desistence may be difficult because leaving the gang lifestyle can be a dangerous and complex process involving threats of being beaten or raped, extortion, or being required to commit a crime (Decker & Lauritsen, 2002; Decker & Van Winkle, 1996).…”

“…Initial evaluations of the HOPE pilot program were positive, with Hawken and Kleiman (2009) reporting significantly fewer positive drug tests, failures to report, arrests for new charges, or technical revocations for HOPE offenders versus the comparison group. However, a number of rigorous evaluations recently published in a 2016 issue of Criminology & Public Policy offer a more dire assessment of the efficacy of the HOPE program and its deterrent-based model (see, for example, Cook, 2016; Hamilton, Campbell, van Wormer, Kigerl, & Posey, 2016; Kleiman, 2016; Lattimore, MacKenzie, Zajac, Dawes, Arsenault, & Tueller, 2016). A notable exception discussed within this host of commentaries and evaluations of HOPE-based programs across the country which have shown positive outcome efficacy is the Supervision with Immediate Enforcement (SWIFT) Court in Tarrant County (see Alm, 2016, and Kleiman, 2016), which identifies high-risk gang offenders for inclusion in the program.…”

HOPE probation: A new path to desistance?

“…In particular, it is clear that Alm played a major role in HOPE’s success in Hawaii; it presents a significant, though not insurmountable, challenge for this aspect to be replicated. Nevertheless, other jurisdictions that have sought to adopt programs based on HOPE have mostly demonstrated reductions in drug use, recidivism, custody and costs (see Carns and Martin, 2011; Cowell et al, 2016; DeVall et al, 2015; Grommon et al, 2013; Hamilton et al, 2015, 2016; Hawken and Kleiman, 2011; Kunkel and White, 2013; Shannon et al, 2015; Snell, 2007; Stevens-Martin, 2014; Zajac et al, 2015, 2016; cf. Lattimore et al, 2016; O’Connell et al, 2016; for discussion, see Bartels, 2017: 124–126).…”

The Monetary Benefits and Costs of Community Supervision

“…To facilitate comparability of the four supervision strategies, the same baseline cost estimates were used. For each supervision strategy, cost estimates were obtained from Hamilton et al (2015) to generate (a) the baseline cost of supervision (US$2,078 per participant) and (b) the baseline cost of violation behavior. The cost for violation behavior was US$1,057 per participant for intensive supervision program (ISP) and risk–need–responsivity (RNR) to process violations in a traditional manner and US$292 per participant for swift, certain, and fair (SCF) as a result of the difference in processing violations.…”

“…The final cost component necessary for three of the supervision strategies was the cost of treatment. The cost of treatment used for SCF was US$99 as reported in Hamilton et al (2015). The cost of treatment for RNR and ISP assumes the cost to participate in cognitive–behavioral therapy (US$433 per participant) as reported by the Washington State Department of Corrections.…”