Impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on grain and fertilizer supply: Evidence from Kenya

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on grain and fertilizer supply to Kenya as the sixth largest economy in Africa using the Regression Discontinuity estimator on monthly data spanning from January 2017 to August 2022. The share of the quantity and value of cereals and fertilizer imports by Kenya from Russia and Ukraine in the total quantity and value of cereals and fertilizer imports by Kenya from world are utilized. The share of freight and insurance costs on grain and fertilizer imports by Kenya from Russia and Ukraine in total freight and insurance costs on grain and fertilizer from world have also been used. After controlling for sensitivity and incorporating depreciation of the exchange rate and a dummy on drought as covariates, the results indicate the war has had insignificant impact on imports of grain and fertilizer by Kenya though the impact is negative for grain but positive for fertilizer. The findings have policy implications touching on need for African countries to diversify import sources for grain and fertilizer, enhance productive capacities through investment on irrigation, strengthen diplomatic ties with existing import sources for grain and fertilizer, and invest in climate action to tackle drought incidences.

Note from the Editor

“…Several articles this June use countries from sub‐Saharan Africa as in‐depth case studies that will be of interest to comparative politics and development scholars as well as to country and regional specialists, policy practitioners and their critics, and those interested more broadly in international relations issues. Ameyaw‐Brobbey (2024) concentrates on the media in Chinese‐African public relations and China's image‐building efforts, particularly in Nigeria, while Mwatu and others (2024) empirically assess the impact of tariff liberalization on economic and social benefits in Kenya. Their article offers rich insights into various optimal liberalization levels that should be considered in negotiating trade agreements.…”

“…本期收录的几篇文章将撒哈拉以南非洲国家作为深度案例研究，为以下人士提供研究兴趣，包括比较政治和发展学者、国家专家和地区专家、政策从业者及其批评者、以及那些更广泛地对国际关系问题感兴趣的人。 Ameyaw‐Brobbey (2024)聚焦于中非公共关系中的媒体以及中国的形象建设工作(特别是在尼日利亚)，而Mwatu、Nafula和Karanja(2024)则实证评估了关税自由化对“肯尼亚的经济效益和社会效益”的影响。Kwablah等人(2024)研究了一系列驱动加纳电子征费(e‐levy)支付意愿的行为因素、心理因素和社会经济因素。…”

“…Varios artículos de junio utilizan países del África subsahariana como estudios de caso en profundidad que serán de interés para los estudiosos de la política comparada y el desarrollo, así como para los especialistas nacionales y regionales, los profesionales de las políticas y sus críticos, y aquellos interesados más ampliamente en las cuestiones internacionales. Ameyaw‐Brobbey (2024) se concentra en los medios de comunicación en las relaciones públicas chino‐africanas y en los esfuerzos de construcción de imagen de China, particularmente en Nigeria, mientras que Mwatu, Nafula y Karanja (2024) evalúan empíricamente el impacto de la liberalización arancelaria en los beneficios económicos y sociales en Kenia. Su artículo ofrece conocimientos ricos en varios niveles de liberalizacíon óptima que debieron ser considerados en la negociación de acuerdos comerciales.…”

A Dynamic Evolutionary Analysis of the Vulnerability of Global Food Trade Networks

“…About 95 percent of Ukraine's food exports relied on maritime trade, with the conflict having resulted in serious damage to ports such as Mariupol and Kherson and the closure of all Black Sea ports, thereby resulting in a significant drop in Ukrainian exports [30,31]. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has affected global food prices and further impacted the world's food supply system [32,33] and has caused a shortage of food supply and inhibited the export of Russian fertilizers [34], thus triggering global food price fluctuations and pushing up global food prices [35]. According to statistics, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has affected the prices of maize and barley by 0.62% and 1.96% [36,37].…”