By exploiting a unique data set on aid allocation by major Arab donors, this paper explores the relationship between aid allocation and the strategic alignment of donors with recipients as well as the developmental need of recipients. To motivate our empirical work, we first develop a new theory of aid allocation, wherein a representative donor country's payoff depends on both the well-being of the representative recipient country as well as its strategic alignment with the donor. Our theoretical model suggests that there exists a positive relationship between donor's aid allocation and the geopolitical and cultural alignment of the recipient country.Our model also predicts that donors allocate more aid to recipient countries with higher levels of country capacity. To test the prediction of our theory empirically, we construct a new measure of geopolitical and cultural alignment for recipient countries by using principal component analysis.We employ this measure and a set of control variables to show that the geopolitical and cultural alignment of a recipient country and its capacity to implement development projects are the key determinants of aid allocation from the Arab donors.
K E Y W O R D SForeign Aid, geopolitical and cultural alignment, political economy of aid | 2461 KIBRIA et Al.
| INTRODUCTIONAlthough the stated objective of foreign aid is typically the economic development of recipient countries, there is a perception that foreign aid may also be politically motivated. These political motives may even be overt. For example, United States aid to both Israel and Egypt since the Camp David Accords is designed to keep the peace between these two countries. However, political motives for aid are more often covert or without clearly stated political objectives. To what extent are foreign aid allocations due to the political alignment of recipient countries with donors rather than their development needs? This paper provides a theoretical framework to address this question and empirically assesses the predictions of the model.Foreign aid allocation in response to a recipient's position on a particular political issue, such as voting behaviour at the United Nations (UN), has empirically been addressed in the literature (see