Imperfect competition in online auctions

Maslov, Alexander; Schwartz, Jesse A.

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102730

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Maslov and Schwartz (2022) show that for a monopolistic seller with two units optimal reserve prices are the same and equal to

r^{*} = J^{- 1} false(0 false)

, where

J false(z false) = z - \frac{1 - F false(z false)}{f false(z false)}

is the virtual valuation (or marginal revenue). It is a common assumption in the auctions literature to assume that this function is non‐decreasing (regularity).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As shown by Maslov and Schwartz (2022), for auctions, optimal prices remain the same, but for posted prices and the dual-selling mechanism optimal prices increase. This happens because each additional buyer raises the probability of sale in the former case and the probability of exiting the auction for a buyer earlier in the latter case.…”

Section: Many Buyersmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…However, because there are only two auctions, when at least three buyers have values higher than the reserve prices, a seller may expect to extract a larger surplus from the buyers. Maslov and Schwartz (2022) show that for a monopolistic seller with two units optimal reserve prices are the same and equal to r * ¼ J À1 ð0Þ, where JðzÞ ¼ z À 1ÀFðzÞ fðzÞ is the virtual valuation (or marginal revenue). It is a common assumption in the auctions literature to assume that this function is non-decreasing (regularity).…”

Section: Single-selling Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 98%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Auctions versus posted prices in the revenue management of limited inventory

Maslov

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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The paper examines a monopolistic seller with a limited inventory, who can sell it by auctions or posted prices in an online market. Previous studies have investigated a seller with unlimited inventory and found that selling by auctions and posted prices is the profit‐maximizing strategy. Contrary to this finding, for limited inventory, mixing selling mechanisms is not always optimal. In particular, when the number of risk‐neutral buyers is high, listing the inventory by auctions generates the highest profit. When faced with risk‐averse buyers, selling by posted prices and auctions is the best strategy. Posted prices are almost always inferior to other listing strategies.

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“…Maslov and Schwartz (2022) show that for a monopolistic seller with two units optimal reserve prices are the same and equal to

r^{*} = J^{- 1} false(0 false)

, where

J false(z false) = z - \frac{1 - F false(z false)}{f false(z false)}

is the virtual valuation (or marginal revenue). It is a common assumption in the auctions literature to assume that this function is non‐decreasing (regularity).…”