Imperfect vaccine can yield multiple Nash equilibria in vaccination games

Augsburger, Ian B.; Galanthay, Grace K.; Tarosky, Jacob H.; Rychtář, Jan; Taylor, Dewey

doi:10.1016/j.mbs.2023.108967

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…We also assume that the vaccine works perfectly. This is an idealisation, since vaccines in practice can work imperfectly and it is known that the effectiveness of a vaccine can have an effect on whether individuals decide to get vaccinated or not [9,37,[43][44][45][46][47], thereby increasing the social dilemma's strength. However, the inclusion of vaccine effectiveness would drastically complicate this study and thus lies outside the scope of this work.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We also neglect effects that represent a positive flux into the susceptible compartment, such as the loss of immunity in recovered people over time [28,33], e.g. due to the emergence of new variants due to mutation [48], or a birth process [33,47]. These effects can result in the existence of (multiple) stationary states [47,49].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…due to the emergence of new variants due to mutation [48], or a birth process [33,47]. These effects can result in the existence of (multiple) stationary states [47,49]. This and other complexities could be included in our approach in principle, such as multiple agent types with different risk and behaviour profiles [19,[50][51][52][53], seasonal effects [54], stochastic control [13,[55][56][57][58], or decentralised optimal behaviour via interventions orchestrated by a benevolent social planner [27][28][29][30][31].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Rational social distancing in epidemics with uncertain vaccination timing

et al. 2023

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During epidemics people may reduce their social and economic activity to lower their risk of infection. Such social distancing strategies will depend on information about the course of the epidemic but also on when they expect the epidemic to end, for instance due to vaccination. Typically it is difficult to make optimal decisions, because the available information is incomplete and uncertain. Here, we show how optimal decision-making depends on information about vaccination timing in a differential game in which individual decision-making gives rise to Nash equilibria, and the arrival of the vaccine is described by a probability distribution. We predict stronger social distancing the earlier the vaccination is expected and also the more sharply peaked its probability distribution. In particular, equilibrium social distancing only meaningfully deviates from the no-vaccination equilibrium course if the vaccine is expected to arrive before the epidemic would have run its course. We demonstrate how the probability distribution of the vaccination time acts as a generalised form of discounting, with the special case of an exponential vaccination time distribution directly corresponding to regular exponential discounting.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rational social distancing in epidemics with uncertain vaccination timing

et al. 2023

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A dynamic game of lymphatic filariasis prevention by voluntary use of insecticide treated nets

Onifade,

Rychtář,

Taylor

2024

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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An innovative fractional-order evolutionary game theoretical study of personal protection, quarantine, and isolation policies for combating epidemic diseases

Akter,

Nurunnahar,

Ullah

et al. 2024

Sci Rep

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This study uses imposed control techniques and vaccination game theory to study disease dynamics with transitory or diminishing immunity. Our model uses the ABC fractional-order derivative mechanism to show the effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions such as personal protection or awareness, quarantine, and isolation to simulate the essential control strategies against an infectious disease spread in an infinite and uniformly distributed population. A comprehensive evolutionary game theory study quantified the significant influence of people’s vaccination choices, with government forces participating in vaccination programs to improve obligatory control measures to reduce epidemic spread. This model uses the intervention options described above as a control strategy to reduce disease prevalence in human societies. Again, our simulated results show that a combined control strategy works exquisitely when the disease spreads even faster. A sluggish dissemination rate slows an epidemic outbreak, but modest control techniques can reestablish a disease-free equilibrium. Preventive vaccination regulates the border between the three phases, while personal protection, quarantine, and isolation methods reduce disease transmission in existing places. Thus, successfully combining these three intervention measures reduces epidemic or pandemic size, as represented by line graphs and 3D surface diagrams. For the first time, we use a fractional-order derivate to display the phase-portrayed trajectory graph to show the model’s dynamics if immunity wanes at a specific pace, considering various vaccination cost and effectiveness settings.

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Imperfect vaccine can yield multiple Nash equilibria in vaccination games

Cited by 4 publications

References 51 publications

Rational social distancing in epidemics with uncertain vaccination timing

Rational social distancing in epidemics with uncertain vaccination timing

A dynamic game of lymphatic filariasis prevention by voluntary use of insecticide treated nets

An innovative fractional-order evolutionary game theoretical study of personal protection, quarantine, and isolation policies for combating epidemic diseases

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