Imperial Allies

What’s This, Then? “Romanes Eunt Domus”?1

“…Marc O’Reilly and Wesley B. Renfro (2007:138) argue that, in the Persian Gulf, “Washington opts for informal empire courtesy of its ‘emirates’ strategy, whose hallmarks include military bases and reciprocity—U.S. protection in exchange for affordable and abundant Gulf oil, most obviously.” Such bilateral security arrangements contain imperial logics, in that they combine elements of indirect rule with asymmetric, heterogeneous contracting (Grygiel 2006).…”

“…None of these concerns render comparisons between the United States and past empires irrelevant for scholars and policy analysts. Nor do they imply that “informal empire” amounts to another way of saying “hegemony.” But we need to be careful about not allowing the unipolar and hegemonic characteristics of past imperial polities to provide evidence for the existence of an American Empire (e.g., Grygiel 2006:210; fn 1). Lieven (1995:608) remarks that “an empire has to be a great power.” Empire, properly understood, describes a form of political control exercised by such minor powers as Belgium and the Netherlands.…”

“…Grygiel (2006:220–221), for example, concludes an otherwise provocative article on “imperial allies” with the following lesson from the Roman experience: “A powerful, and timeless, reminder of the consequences of a defeat—and withdrawal, albeit temporary, from international commitments—is the immediate aftermath of the battle of Cannae (216 BCE), where the Roman army was thoroughly beaten by Hannibal’s Carthaginian invading force.” The defeat led “several Italian allies of Rome” to defect “to Hannibal’s side.” The “United States,” he notes, “may want to heed this lesson when it deals with its current allies” and thereby not expect “retreat” to “lead to an increase in friendly feelings abroad, as some hope.”…”