Impermissive Bayesianism

Meacham, Christopher J. G.

doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9547-z

Cited by 58 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This view avoids the sub-74. For some recent discussion on the merits of Evidential Uniqueness, see Kelly (2013), Horowitz (2013), Meacham (2013), White (2013), Schoenfield (2014), and Titelbaum and Kopec (2016 Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization · 489 stantial commitments or demerits of the other views; indeed, it incurs no further commitments beyond those of the standard Bayesian approach. And yet it offers a way to deal with complaints regarding evidence loss and self-locating beliefs, and (given the assumption about evidence) is not subject to worries regarding confirmation.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Meacham¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Conditionalization is a widely endorsed rule for updating one's beliefs. But a sea of complaints have been raised about it, including worries regarding how the rule handles error correction, changing desiderata of theory choice, evidence loss, self-locating beliefs, learning about new theories, and confirmation. In light of such worries, a number of authors have suggested replacing Conditionalization with a different ruleone that appeals to what I'll call ur-priors. But different authors have understood the rule in different ways, and these different understandings solve different problems. In this paper, I aim to map out the terrain regarding these issues. I survey the different problems that might motivate the adoption of such a rule, flesh out the different understandings of the rule that have been proposed, and assess their pros and cons. I conclude by suggesting that one particular batch of proposals, proposals that appeal to what I'll call loaded evidential standards, are especially promising.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Meacham¹

2016

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For a recent defense of the POI, see White (2010). For critical discussion of White's arguments, see Meacham (2014). In fn.…”

Section: Probabilistic Promotion and The Interpretation Questionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic promotion revisited

Behrends

DiPaolo

2015

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Promotion is the relation between an act and a desire that obtains when the act advances or serves the desire. Under what conditions does an act promote a desire? Probabilistic accounts of promotion, the most prominent accounts, analyze promotion in terms of an increase in the probability of the desire's satisfaction. In this paper, we clarify the promotion relation and explain why probabilistic accounts are attractive. Then we identify two questions probabilistic accounts must answer: the Baseline Question and the Interpretation Question. We discuss and reject the three answers to the Baseline Question found in the literature, and explain the challenge future attempts at answering this question will face. Proponents of probabilistic accounts have not adequately addressed the Interpretation Question. We survey three answers to this question, finding each unsatisfactory. We conclude that no satisfactory probabilistic account has yet been offered, and that there are significant hurdles to providing one in the future.

show abstract

“…After all, cases in which your credence 17 White presents many arguments against Permissivism, but I take this to be the central objection unifying all of them.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…18 Kelly (2014), Meacham (2014), and Titelbaum and Kopec (2015) also defend Intrapersonal Uniqueness, and discuss how this view helps us respond to White. 19 Thanks to Bernhard Salow for discussion on the arguments of this section.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Schultheis

2017

Mind

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Impermissive Bayesianism

Cited by 58 publications

References 19 publications

Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization

Probabilistic promotion revisited

Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About